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CHINA AND THE QUESTION OF TERRITORIAL SEA
HUNGDAH CHIU*
1. Introduction
In recent years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has
become an ardent supporter and champion of the claim for the
200 nautical mile territorial sea right or maritime right' asserted
primarily by many Latin American countries. This problem, in
the PRC's view, is not only a problem concerning the law of the
sea, but it is very significant in the struggle by the Third World
countries, with which the PRC identifies itself, against the
hegemony of the two superpowers-the United States and the
Soviet Union.
A recent secret educational document on international situa-
tions distributed to the company level of the PRC army, viewed
the struggle for a 200 nautical mile territorial sea right as a
basic indicator of the struggle against the superpowers in
Latin America. The document observed:
In Latin America, which used to be called the back-
yard of American imperialism, the fire has been lighted.
Not long ago fourteen Latin American states jointly
took action to oppose the unreasonable method of limit-
ing the breadth of the territorial sea by the two super-
powers. They have insisted that American countries
have the right to define the limit of their territorial sea
and have firmly defended their 200 nautical mile terri-
torial sea rights.2
At the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea held at Caracas between June and August, 1974, the PRC
actively supported the position of the Third World. In his
policy speech delivered on July 2, the Leader of the PRC Dele-
gation Chai Shu-fan said:
*Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; LL.B.,
1958, National Taiwan University; M.A. with honors, 1962, Long Island University; LL.M.,
1962 and S.J.D., Harvard; Member, Panel on China and International Order, American So-
ciety of International Law.
1 Until recently, the PRC referred to Latin American claims for 200 mile territorial sea,
economic zone, or patrimonial sea generally as "ling-hai ch'uan" (territorial sea right). How-
ever, recent PRC documents and press reports began to use the term "hai-yang ch'uan"
(maritime right) to refer to such claims. For the PRC's views on the difference between
territorial sea or economic zone, see note 136 and accompanying text infra.
mCHINESE COMMUNIST DOCUMENT: OUTLINE OF EDUCATION ON SITUATION FOR COMPANIES
6 (with English translation). Lesson I, at 2 (Chinese text) (Propaganda Division, Po-
litical Department, Kunming Military Region ed., 1973, distributed by Institute of Interna-
tional Relations, Taipei, 1974). I have translated the text from the Chinese.
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The new legal regime of the sea must accord with the
interests of the numerous developing countries, the
basic interests of the people of the world and the direc-
tion in which the times are advancing.... Our common
lot and common tasks provide a firm foundation for our
unity in the fight. This is an important guarantee for
our victory....
Although we developing countries may have differences
of one kind or another on certain specific issues, it is
fully possible and essential for us, on the premise of
mutual respect for sovereignty and of unity against
hegemonism, to work out a reasonable solution
through friendly consultations in a spirit of seeking
common ground while reserving differences, and of
equality and mutual benefit.3
Paralleling its growing interest in the law of the sea, the
PRC has quietly built its naval force in recent years. A recent
study indicates that the PRC's navy is the world's third largest,
with a strength of 150,000 officers and men and more than 100
vessels in active service.4
In the past few years, the increase in the PRC's ocean-going
merchant fleet has been dramatic. According to a reliable source,
in 1961 the PRC fleet consisted of 141 ships totaling 696,000
deadweight tons. By 1969, this had increased to 1.3 million
deadweight tons, a rise of 85 percent, and by the latter part of
1974 total deadweight tonnage was 2.5 million tons, an increase
of 92 per cent over the 1969 figure.5 It appears that the PRC is
in the process of actively developing itself as a major maritime
power.
In view of the foregoing, the importance of studying the PRC
attitude toward the law of the sea is apparent. This article
undertakes to study the PRC's view on one important aspect of
the law of the sea-the question of territorial sea and its related
problems. Although some recent studies have been done on PRC's
territorial sea practice, 6 they concentrate primarily on the 1958
PRC Declaration on China's Territorial Sea and the practice
$At U.N. Conference on Law of the Sea, Chinese Delegation Leader Chai Shu-fan's
Speech, 17 PEKING REVIEW 11, 14 (No. 28, July 12, 1974).
4See Uhlig, Red China's Navy is World's Third Largest, SEAPOWER 19-24 (Mar., 1973).
It has 42 submarines, 4 destroyers, 20 frigates and escorts, 17 missile boats, 54 landing
ships and landing craft, and other vessels. THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK 1973-1974, at 816-
817 (John Paxton ed. 110th ed. 1973).
3 Smith, Voyage of the Fenghuang Chinese Shipping Success, Hong Kong (UPI), The
Daily Record, Mar. 5, 1975, at 1, 7. See also I-CHIU-CH'I-SAN CHUNG-KUNG NiEN-PAO(Yearbook on Chinese Communism, 1973) 11-133 (Taipei, 1973).
6 E.g., Cheng Tao, Communist China and the Law of the Sea, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 47-73
(1969); HSIUNG, LAW AND POLICY IN CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 103-117 (1972).
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before and immediately after this Declaration. Moreover, these
studies pay only casual attention to pre-1949 China's practice
and totally ignore the view of the Republic of China (ROC) on
Taiwan after 1949. This is a serious deficiency in view of the
ROC's strategic geographical location and its importance as a
world maritime power.
The ROC not only controls the strategic island of Taiwan
which faces the mainland Chinese provinces of Chekiang,
Fukien and Kwangtung, but also has a sizable navy, 7 ocean-
going maritime fleet, deep-ocean fishery industry, and a signifi-
cant expanding shipbuilding industry.8 In 1974, the ROC carried
on a two-way international trade of more than 12 billion US
dollars and almost all import and export goods were trans-
ported by maritime fleet.s
Until late 1971, the ROC government represented China at
the United Nations and its specialized or affiliated agencies. 10 It
represented China at the First and Second United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea held separately in 1958 and 1960
at Geneva. Furthermore, the pre-1949 Chinese practice, in-
cluding that of the ROC, has had upon several occasions a
direct bearing on the PRC's practice. For instance, the PRC's
extension in 1958 of its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles was
prompted by its attempt to exclude United States intervention
during its attempted capture of Quemoy, an offshore island held
by the ROC."1
The focus of this article is both historical and analytical. It
will begin with the introduction of the regime of territorial sea
to China in the nineteenth century, analyze the ROC practice
both before and after its removal to Taiwan, and finally ex-
amine the PRC's practice and its attitude toward the recent
development of the law of territorial seas and related problems.
Before proceeding to these problems, it would be helpful to
give a general survey of physical features of China's coast and
7 In 1972, the ROC had 14 destroyers, 16 frigates, 3 escort vessels, 25 landing ships and
other vessels. It had 88,000 naval officers and ratings and 34,000 marine officers and men.
THE STATESMAN'S YrAaBOOK 1973-1974, supre note 4, at 824.
a See notes 59, 60, and 61. and accompanying text, infra.
sChung-yang jih-pao (Central daily news), Jan. 4, 1975, at 1; 16 FEE CHINA WEEKLY
4 (No. 3, Jan. 19, 1975).
a By Resolution 2758 (XXVI) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on
October 25, 1971, the Assembly decided that the PRC government should represent China in
the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it. FRIEDMANN, LtssrrzYN, &
PUGH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 26-27 (Supp. 1972). Since then, the PRC government has
represented China in all United Nations-affiliated or related organizations except the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation, International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (World Bank), and International Development Association.11 See notes 75-78 infra and accompanying text.
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adjacent sea-bed.1- China's continental coastline begins at the
mouth of the Yalu River on the Chinese-North Korean border
and ends at the Peilun River on the Chinese-North Vietnamese
border.. It is approximately 11,900 kilometers13 in length.
Hanchow Bay divides China's coast into two parts. North of the
bay the coast is sandy, with the exception of the rocky shores of
the Shantung and Liaotung peninsula; south of the bay it is
mostly rocky.
China has more than 3,500 islands, of which the two largest
are Taiwan and Hainan. Most other islands are less than 1,000
square kilometers. Over 2,900 islands (mostly of the rocky type)
are scattered along the coasts south of the Hanchow Bay. The
coastline of China's continental coast and islands has a total
length of 23,400 kilometers.
The seas facing China's coast include the Pohai (Gulf of
Chili or Pohai) in the north, the Yellow Sea and the East China
Sea in the middle, and the South China Sea in the south.
According to a report of the United Nations Economic Com-
mission on Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) released in 1969,
the seabed adjacent to the Chinese coast and beneath the Yellow
and East China Seas has the following features:,
(1) The Yellow Sea area, comprising approximately 500,000
square kilometers is a flat region with depths that average
about 55 meters,15 and nowhere exceed 125 meters. The western
side is bordered by the combined deltas of the Yellow and
Yangtze Rivers plus the hilly projection of the Shantung Penin-
sula. The eastern side of the Yellow Sea is hilly and fringed by
hundreds of small rocky islands. Lowlands border the mouths
of the Han River of the Republic of Korea, the Yalu River of
North Korea, and the Liao River of China in the Gulf of Pohai.
(2) Immediately following this area is a large continental
shelf of approximately 110,000 square kilometers. At the north
the shelf takes the form of Tsushima Strait between Korea and
Japan, a width of about 150 kilometers. The middle part of the
shelf fronts the Yellow Sea, and the southern part borders the
Chinese mainland from the mouth of the Yangtze River to
beyond Taiwan Strait. The outer edge of the shelf is off the
Yangtze River where it reaches 450 kilometers; farther south-
west the shelf narrows to about 125 kilometers in the Taiwan
Strait.
2 The description is generally based on CHIAO-MIN HSIEH, ATLnA OF CHINA 19-20 (Salter
ed. 1973) and CHINA YEARBOK 1972-1973, at 47.
" One kilometer is about 3281 feet or five-eighths of a mile.
14Emory, Geological Structure and Some Water Characteristics of the East China Sea
and the Yellow Sea, 2 TECH. BULL., ECAFE 13, 25, 26 (1969).
"One foot is about 0.3048 meter.
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(3) At the edge of the continental shelf area is the Okinawa
Trough. The deepest part, near the eastern part of Taiwan
reaches 2,270 meters. East and south of the Trough are the
Ryukyu Islands.
In the South China Sea area, the continental shelf extends
from the Taiwan Strait to the Kwangtung Province, Hainan
Island, and then to Vietnam. The width of the shelf is approxi-
mately 200 kilometers in Kwangtung, then gradually narrows
to less than 100 kilometers in the southern part of Vietnam. Off
the 200 meter depth line of the shelf, the seabed abruptly drops
off to abyssal plains. The Paracel and Spratly Islands, about 230
nautical miles apart, sit mid-ocean where the depth drops im-
mediately to almost 1,000 meters around the Paracels and about
3,000 meters at some points around the Spratlies.16
2. The Introduction of the
Regime of Territorial Sea to China
Throughout the long history of China, Chinese merchant and
naval vessels were quite active in the seas adjacent to the Chinese
coast. The Chinese navy in the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) was
reported to make regular patrol for a long period in East China
Sea and sailed as far as the present Tiao-yu-tai Islets (Senkaku
Gunto). 1 7 The Chinese government enacted various laws and
decrees concerning maritime matters. In the Ch'ing Dynasty,
comprehensive provisions were enacted in the chapter on Mili-
tary and Border Affairs of the Ch'ing Code for control of mari-
time trade and of persons sailing to the sea, and for punishment
of crimes committed on the seas. 8
In the Ch'ing Code, a distinction was made in a number of
places between "nei-yang" (inner ocean) and "wai-yang" (outer
ocean). In an 1817 case concerning the ship Wabash commanded
by Captain Gant (or C. L. Gratt) from Baltimore, Maryland,
the Ch'ing government noted that although the "barbarian
merchant Ao-ti [Gant]" brought opium to China in violation
of Chinese law, since the ship was anchored in the "outer ocean"
and did not enter the Chinese port, the "barbarian merchant"
should not be punished. On the other hand, several Chinese who
tried to blackmail "the barbarian merchant" Ao-ti and his crew
is YA-KUANG Yu-Ti HsUCH-SHE, Chart of Atlas of Islands in South China Sea., in
CHUNG-HUA JEN-MIN KuNG-Ho-Kuo FBN-SHENG TI-T'u (Atlas of the Provinces of the
People's Republic of China) 41 (6th rev. ed. 1953).
1? See Map of Coastal Mountains and Sands, in CH'ou-HAi T'u-PiEN (Maps concerning
sea defense) 20 (Hu Chung-hsien ed., 1562). The map was reproduced in Inoue, The His-
tory and Sovereignty of the Tiaoyu Islands (Senkaku Gunto) (further study), CHUGOKU-
xENKYU GEPPO (China Study Monthly), No. 292, at 8-9 (June, 1972).
Is See 3 TA-CH'INo Lu-LI Hui-T'UNG HsiN-TSUAN (Comprehensive New Edition of the
Ch'ing Code) 1711-1755 (authors unknown, 1872 edition was reprinted in Taipei, 1964).
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and robbed the ship and killed several crew members in the
"outer ocean" were decapitated or otherwise severely punished. 9
China's reluctance to extend its jurisdiction over aliens to the
''outer ocean" is somewhat similar to the Western practice of
this period, based on the distinction between territorial sea and
high sea.Y Research into Ch'ing history to date, however, has
not revealed how the Chinese defined the extent of the "inner
ocean" and the method of its measurement. It appears that this
practice did not develop into a sophisticated regime similar to
that of the territorial sea in western international law.
By the middle of the nineteenth century a number of com-
mercial treaties concluded by China with western powers made
explicit reference, in general terms, to Chinese jurisdiction over
its adjacent maritime belt. Aiticle 26 of the Sino-American
Treaty of Peace, Amity, and Commerce signed at Wang Hiya
on July 3, 1844, provided that "if the merchant-vessels of the
United States, while within the waters over which the Chinese
government exercises jurisdiction, be plundered by robbers or
pirates, then the Chinese local authorities, civil and military, on
receiving information thereof, will arrest the said robbers or
pirates, and punish them according to law . . ." (Emphasis
added) .21 Similarly, Article 19 of the Treaty of Peace, Friend-
ship and Commerce, between Great Britain and China, signed
at Tientsin on June 26, 1856, also provided that "if any British
merchant vessel, while within Chinese waters, be plundered by
robbers or Pirates, it shall be the duty of the Chinese authorities
to use every endeavour to capture and punish the .said robbers
or Pirates . . ." (Emphasis added) .22 However, none of these
provisions defined the extent of Chinese "waters," and the
Chinese apparently were unaware of the existence of a regime
of the territorial sea in international law until 1864, when
W. A. P. Martin translated Wheaton's Elements of International
Law into Chinese.23
"See 1 CH'ING-TAI WAI-CrnAo SHIH-LIAO, CHIAoCHING CH'AO, TAO-KuANG CH'AO (His-
torical Materials Concerning Foreign Relations in the Ch'ing Period, Chia-ch'ing Period,
1796-1820, Tao-Kuang Period to 1831) 678-685 (Palace Museum ed. 1931-1933, Taipei re-
printed ed. 1968). For an English summary of this ease, see 1 Lo-SHU Fu, A DOCUMEN-
TARy CHRONICLE OF SINO-WESTERN RELATIONS (1644-1820) 408-413 (1966); 2 id. 621.
1 The jurisdiction over the Chinese involved in the same case apparently was based on the
nationality principle and the locus criminus was not therefore relevant.
- 6 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
1776-1949, 658 (Bevins, comp.. 1971). Similar provisions were made in Article 26 of the
Treaty of Peace, Amity, and Commerce between Sweden and Norway, and China, signed
at Canton on March 20, 1847. 1 HERTSLET'S CHINA TREATIES 536 (3rd rev. ed., 1908).
-2 Id. art. 25.
n The relevant part of Wheaton concerning the breadth of territorial sea is as follows:
"§6. Maritime territorial jurisdiction. The maritime territory of every State extends to the
ports, harbors, bays, mouths of rivers, and adjacent parts of the sea inclosed by headlands,
belonging to the same State. The general usage of nations superadds to this extent of terri-
torial jurisdiction a distance of a marine league, or as far as a cannon-shot will reach
from the shore, along all the coasts of the State. Within these limits its rights of property
and territorial jurisdiction are absolute, and exclude those of every other nation.
§7. Extent of the term coasts or shore. The term 'coasts' includes the natural appendages
of the territory which rise out of the water, although these islands are not of sufficient
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With the translation of Wheaton into Chinese, China's con-
ception of its territorial sea became more sophisticated. In
1864, during the Prussian-Danish War, the Prussian minister
to China, von Rehfues, arrived in the Gulf of Chili (Pohai) on a
warship. Finding three Danish merchant ships in the Gulf, he
captured them. The Chinese government protested on the ground
that the capture was made within the Chinese "inner ocean" and
somewhat vaguely cited principles of international law contained
in Wheaton's Chinese translation to support its argument. Sub-
sequently, the Prussian Minister acknowledged the illegality
of the act, released two of the Danish ships, and paid compensa-
tion for the third. In Prince Kung's memorial to the Emperor,
he pointed out that "foreign countries always maintain that the
ocean 10 or more 1i [one 1i is about one-third of a mile] off the
coast, which cannot be reached by guns and batteries, is con-
sidered the public area of all the countries and can be sailed and
occupied as one wishes."'24 This was an apparent reference to
the territorial sea and high sea in international law.
In 1874, when Chinese Viceroy Li Hung-chang sought to
justify Korea's (then a tributary state of China) action in
firing upon a Japanese warship that appeared near the Korean
coast, one of the arguments he made was that, according to
international law the width of the territorial sea was 10 1i (ap-
proximately 3 nautical miles) and the Korean action was
a legitimate response to the infringement of Korean territorial
sea.
2 5
Although Chinese knowledge concerning the Western concept
of a regime of the territorial sea was growing, the scope of the
territorial sea claimed by the Ch'ing remained unclear. In the
Sino-Mexico Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
signed on December 14, 1899, the contracting parties, in Article
11, agreed to consider "a distance of 3 marine leagues [approxi-
mately 9 nautical miles], measured from the line of low tide, as
firmness to be inhabited or fortified; but it does not properly comprehend all the shoals
which form sunken continuations of the land perpetually covered with water. The rule of
law on this subject is. terrai dominium Ainitur, ubi funitur armorum vie; and since the
introduction of fire-arms, that distance has usually been recognized to be about three miles
from the shore." H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 233-234 (6th ed. 1855).
This part was translated into Chinese in 2 WAN-KUo KUNG-FA (Laws and regulations of
all states) 67 (W.A.P. Martin trans. 1864).
"' 6 CH'OU-PAN I-Wu SHIH-MO (The Complete Account of our Management of Barbarian
Affairs) 658 (Chuan 26, at 29-30, 33, [Peking, Palace Museum ed. 1930], Taipei reprinted
ed. 1963). See also id. 677 (Chuan 27, at 25-26). For a summary of the incident see also.
TENG & FAIRBANK, CHINA'S RESPONSE TO THE WEST, A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, 1839-1923,
at 97-99 (1954); T.F. Tsiang. Bismarck and the Introduction of International Law into
China, 15 THE CHINESE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 98-101 (No. 1, Apr., 1931).
2 See the minutes of the conversation between Li Hung-chang and the Japanese minister,
Mori Arinori, annexed to the memorial submitted by the Tsungli Yamen to the Emperor
on the Japanese intention to enter into friendly relations with Korea, dated Jan. 17, 1876,
in I CH'ING KUANG-Hsu CH'AO CHUNG-JIH CHIAO-SHE SHIH-LIAO (Historical materials
relating to Sino-Japanese relations during the reign of the Kuang-hsu Emperor) 8
(Peiping, Palace Museum ed. 1932).
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the limit of their territorial waters for everything relating to
the vigilance and enforcement of the custom-house Regulations
and the necessary measures for the prevention of smuggling. 28
The implication of this article is not clear, and there is no other
evidence showing that the Ch'ing government had claimed a 9
nautical mile territorial sea.
In 1908, in a case involving the capture of a Japanese ship,
the Ta Tsu Maru, the Ch'ing government claimed that the ship
was arrested within 2 nautical miles of the Chinese coast.27 It
appears that China and Japan negotiated on the assumption
that the generally accepted width of the territorial sea was 3
nautical miles.
In neither of the above two cases, however, can it be said that
China was explicitly claiming a territorial sea of specified width.
Rather, China utilized newly understood western concepts to its
advantage without wholly embracing them as policy. Therefore,
it seems that despite the increasing sophistication of the Ch'ing's
understanding of the western concept of a regime of the terri-
torial sea with clearly defined limits, the Ch'ing never defined
for itself its own territorial sea.
3. The Republic of China and the
Problem of Territorial Sea
In the first year of the Republic of China (1912), the Chinese
government began seriously to consider the question of the width
of the territorial sea. At that time, the Ministry of the Navy
expressed its view to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a letter
dated July 10:
Generally, the boundary of the territorial sea should
be limited to 3 nautical miles [off the coast]. How-
ever, this limit was formulated according to the range
of a cannon shot. Presently, the range of a cannon shot
is much farther; therefore, Hall's public international
law book said that at the Paris International Law Con-
ference, the majority of the members approved the
theory that the territorial sea should be extended to 6
nautical miles.28 As a matter of fact, the farthest range
35 1 HmrszLET's CHINA TREATIES. supra note 21 at 403-404. It was reported that in 1902
Mexico adopted the 3-mile territorial sea. 4 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
14 (1965).
" See WAI-CHLAO TA TZ'U-TIEN (Great Dictionary of Diplomacy) 722-23 (1965); 4
WHITEMAN. s Pr note 26. China subsequently released the ship for political reasons.
1 The relevant provision from Hall follows:
"After being carefully studied and reported upon by a Committee of the Institut de Droit
International, the subject was exhaustively discussed by the Institut at its meeting in Paris,
in 1894, the exceptionally large number of thirty-nine members being present. With regard
to the necessity of ascribing a greater breadth than three miles of territorial water to the
littoral state there was no difference of opinion. As to the extent to which the marginal belt
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of a cannon shot now can reach 10 nautical miles, so it
seems that we should extend our territorial sea [to such
a width] so as to protect our maritime rights. 9
But, no decision was made on whether China should accept the
3 nautical mile limit or should have a broader width of the
territorial sea.30
In 1921, the President of the Republic approved a proposal
of the Ministry of Navy for setting up a Committee on Maritime
Boundary to discuss the question of China's territorial sea. The
committee decided at its fifth meeting, held on September 6,
1921, that China should follow the practice of other countries
by prescribing its territorial sea as 3 nautical miles. 31 It is
not clear whether the President took any action on the decision
of the committee .32
It was not until the Nationalist government assumed the
command of the Republic of China that China clarified its posi-
tion on the territorial sea. At the 1930 Hague Conference on
Codification of International Law, it took the position that the
width of the territorial sea should be 3 nautical miles, meas-
ured from the low-water marks along the coast.3 3 This position
did not mean, however, that China was satisfied with the regime
of a 3 nautical mile territorial sea. On July 5, 1929, the Vice-
Commander of the Navy and member of the Northeast (Man-
churia) Political Council, General Shen Hung-lieh, sent an of-
ficial communication to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pro-
posing that the Chinese territorial sea should be prescribed as 12
nautical miles and the Gulf of Pohai (Chili) as entirely China's
should be enlarged and the principle upon which enlargement should be based, the same
unanimity was not manifested; but ultimately it was resolved by a large majority that a
zone of six marine miles from low water mark ought to be considered territorial for all
purposes, and that in time of war a neutral state should have the right to extend this
zone, by declaration of neutrality or by notification, for all purposes of neutrality, to a
distance from the shore corresponding to the extended range of cannon." A TREATISE ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 (6th ed. by Atlay, 1909).
'9 CHUNG-JIH YU-YEH CHIAO-SHa (Sino-Japanese Fisheries Negotiations) (June 2- Nov.
19, 1912, Diplomatic Archives, Taipei, Academia Sinica). Cited also in KAN HUANG, CHUNG-
HUA MIN-KUo Ti LING-HAI CH'I HSIANG KUAN CHIH-TU (The regime of territorial sea of
the Republic of China) 5, 70 (1973).
M Before China joined the First World War on August 14, 1917, it enacted an "Act on
Neutrality" which made a number of references to "ling-hai" (territorial sea) in its pro-
visions, but the Act did not specify the width of China's territorial sea. In the application
of the Act, it did not appear that there had been any significant cases between China and
other countries concerning the width of China's territorial sea. For a summary of the
cases contained in the diplomatic archives, see generally, KAN HUANG, supra note 29, at
125-137.
3"The minutes of this meeting were sent to the Foreign Ministry on September 13, 1921.
HAI-CHIEH T'Ao-LUN AN (Case concerning maritime boundary discussions) (July 2 - Nov.
8, 1921, Diplomatic Archives. Taipei, Academia Sinica).
v-According to Pao Tsun-p'eng, a presidential decree on the boundary of territorial sea
was promulgated in March, 1924. See his 2 CHUNG-Kuo HAI-CHUN SHIH (History of Chi-
nese Navy) 523-524 (1970). However, he gave no reference to this decree and the author
could not identify the source of this information.
3' For conference documents concerning the width of territorial and the position of the
Chinese Delegation, see 24 AM. J. INT'L. L. 25, 27, 234-235, 254 (Supp. 1930).
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territorial sea as a matter of historical right.4 While the Foreign
Ministry did not take action on the proposal of 12 nautical miles
territorial sea, it did instruct the Chinese delegate to the Hague
Conference to make clear, at the appropriate occasion, that
China regarded the Gulf of Pohai as her territorial sea on his-
torical grounds.3 5
In 1930, the Headquarters of the General Staff of the Na-
tionalist Government prepared a draft proposal on the boundary
of the territorial sea and submitted it to the Executive Yuan
in January, 1931.36 This was the first attempt by the Chinese
government to enact a comprehensive system of rules on the
regime of the territorial sea. The document analysed in detail
the advantages and disadvantages of a limited or extended ter-
ritorial sea and noted that a weak country with "a weak naval
force and a small number of commercial and fishing vessels
absolutely does not dare to [encroach on] the territorial sea and
the adjacent high sea of a strong power.13 7 Moreover, since a
weak country's "national power is not sufficient to protect its
rights within the territorial sea, it can only think of relying on
public international law to deter a strong power's encroachment
on its fishery, to maintain its neutral rights in time of war and
to facilitate its measures of sea defense. ' 38 It concluded that it is
"advantageous for a weak country to support a regime of ex-
tended territorial sea. '39 The Headquarters of the General Staff,
therefore, proposed that China should have a 12 nautical mile
territorial sea. It also observed that by claiming a 12 nautical
mile territorial sea, China could claim the entire Gulf of Pohai
as internal waters.
After seriously considering the matter, the Executive Yuan
took a compromise approach to the question. In the Order Pre-
scribing the Scope of the Territorial Sea as Three Nautical Miles
in April, 1931, it explicitly provided that although China ac-
cepted the 3 nautical mile territorial sea, it nevertheless claimed
a 12 nautical mile limit for investigating smuggling.40 In 1934,
a Customs Preventive Law was enacted which set the limit for
34 Official Communication from Shen Hung-lieh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July
6, 1929, on file in the Diplomatic Archives, Taipei, Academia Sinica.
" Correspondence between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Wu Chao-shu, Chief Chi-
nese delegate to the Hague Codification Conference, March 14, 17, 19, 24, 26. 1930, on file
in Diplomatic Archives, Taipei, Academia Sinica. The Hague Conference did not make any
decision on historical bays or gulfs, so the Chinese delegate did not raise the question of
the Gulf of Pohai at the Conference. Telegram from Wu Chao-shu to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, April 12, 1930. Id.
"On file in Diplomatic Archives, supra note 34. The exact dates of the draft and the sub-
mission to the Executive Yuan cannot be determined.
37 Id.
SId.
29 Id.
o For the text of the order, see 3 CHUNG-HUA MIN-Kuo FA-KUEI HUI-PIEN (Collection of
laws and decrees of the Republic of China) Part IV, NEI-CHENG (Internal affairs) 715
(1934).
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enforcing that law as 12 nautical miles off the coast.4 1 Although
the Republic of China has maintained this position since then,
it has upon a number of occasions seriously considered ex-
panding its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles.
After Japan surrendered to China and other Allied powers in
1945, the Ministry of Internal Affairs invited various units of
the government to discuss the question of the limit of the ter-
ritorial sea. At that time, the Fishing Department of the
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry proposed that the terri-
torial sea should be 12 nautical miles. The Executive Yuan gave
instructions that the proposal should be "temporarily deferred
for consideration. 4 2 Two years later, however, in the Measures
on Permitting Japanese Fishing Vessels to Fish in the High
Seas Off the Coast of China, Korea, and the Ryukyus, promul-
gated jointly by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 13, 1947'43 it was
explicitly provided that Japanese fishing vessels should not fish
within 12 miles of the Chinese coast. The decree seemed to indi-
cate that in addition to customs preventive measures, China
would claim a 12 mile limit to protect its economic interests in
coastal fishing.'4
When the United Nations International Law Commission be-
gan to discuss the codification of the law of the sea, the ROC
government notified the Chinese member of the Commission,
Dr. Shuhsi Hsu, that China preferred a 12 nautical mile ter-
ritorial sea.4 5 At the 166th meeting held on July 17, 1952, Dr.
Hsu said that he was convinced that a 12 mile limit of ter-
ritorial sea was the best solution to the problem of delimiting
the territorial sea.46 On June 9, 1955, at the 308th meeting of
the Commission, he proposed the following amendment to Ar-
ticle 3 (Breadth of the Territorial Sea) of the Draft Articles on
the Law of the Sea:
The coastal State may, however, extend the terri-
torial sea up to a limit of 12 nautical miles from the
baseline. 7
41 For relevant provisions of the law, see LAW AND REGULATIONS ON THE REGIME OF THE
TEFrToRAL SEA 113, U.N. Leg. Ser. ST./Lzo./SEZ. B/6 (1956).
4CHANG PAO-SHU, HAT-YANG FA YEN-CHIu (Studies on the Law of the Sea) 39 (1957).
43KUo-MIN CHEN-Fu KUNG-PAO (Gazette of the National Government), No. 2756, at 2
(Feb. 26, 1947).
44 A United States Department of State study found that ROC practice in fact indicates
a claim to a 12 nautical mile exclusive fishing zone. OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, UNITED
STATES DEPT. OF STATE, INT'L BOUNDARY STUDY: LIMITS IN THE SEAS (Ser. A) (herein-
after cited as INT'L BOUNDARY STUDY), NATIONAL CLAIMS TO MARITIME JURISDICTION 18 (No.
43 1972).
An official of the ROC Ministry of Economics said, on April 23, 1970, that the Chinese
exclusive fishing zone is 12 nautical miles off the low water line of the coast. Chung-kuo
Shih-pao (China Times), April 24, 1970.
' CHANG PAO-SHU. supra note 42.
' 11952] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMX'N 153, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1952.
" [1955] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 152, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955.
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He observed that the 3 mile limit was not wide enough to
satisfy many states in the Far East and in Latin America
which, "although... like. . . China, had previously adopted the
3 mile limit, now desired to extend their territorial sea be-
yond 3 miles, partly in order to defend themselves against
subversive activities and partly in order to protect their small
fishery industry against ruinous competition by well-organized
foreign fishing concerns.11
4
Ironically, Dr. Hsu's position ran counter to that of the
United States, the ROC's friend and ally, and coincided with
that of the Soviet Union, the ROC's enemy at the time. There-
fore, after repeated requests from the United States government,
Dr. Hsu softened its position on the 12 nautical mile limit of the
territorial sea.49 At the 361st meeting of the Commission held
on June 6, 1956, he proposed the following compromise amend-
ment to Article 3 of the Draft Articles:
1. The breadth of the territorial sea may be determined
by each coastal State in accordance with its economic
and strategic needs within the limits of 3 and 12
miles, subject to recognition by States maintaining a
narrower belt.
2. In the event of disagreement, the matter shall be
referred to arbitration.50
The amendment was rejected by 9 votes to 3 with 2 abstentions
at the 363rd meeting of the Commission held on June 8, 1956.-1
In the Draft Articles concerning the Law of the Sea, adopted
by the Commission in 1956, there was no provision for the
breadth of the territorial sea; and the report to the General
Assembly merely noted that the Commission "considers that
international law does not permit an extension of the terri-
torial sea beyond 12 [nautical] miles" and the breadth
"should be fixed by an international conference. ' '1 2 When the
Draft Articles were sent to member states of the United Nations
for comments, the ROC government's comment on Article 3
was essentially the same as that proposed by Dr. Hsu at the
Commission in 1956. It said that the conference "may probably
establish a maximum permissible breadth based on the findings
48 Mr. Hsu's statement at the 312th meeting of the Commission held on June 15, 1955.
Id. 172-173.
49 CHANG PAO-SHU, supra note 42, at 76.
5, [1956] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 163, Doc. A/CN.4/SEs.A/1956.
51 Id. 181.
52Int'l Law Comm'n Report, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956); re-
printed in 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 154, 161 (1957).
PRC-TERRITORIAL SEA
of the International Law Commission [i.e., 12 nautical miles]
and, at the same time, leave to each State the right of not recog-
nizing the breadth fixed by any other State, which, though not
exceeding the maximum permissible limit, is greater than that
of its own. '"
5 3
With respect to the method of delimiting the territorial sea
provided in Article 5 of the Draft Articles, the Chinese govern-
ment, in principle, agreed that a straight baseline could be used
in delimiting the territorial sea. However, it was noted that a
maximum permissible length of the straight baseline should be
worked out to avoid confusion and dispute.54 Moreover, the ROC
also supported the idea that coastal states should have exclusive
fishing rights in their contiguous zone.5
At the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, held in the
spring of 1958, the ROC did not make any proposal on the limit
of the territorial sea, but it rejected the view that the terri-
torial sea could be unilaterally delimited by a coastal state to
meet its particular needs. It observed that there must be a
proper balance among three kinds of interests in deciding the
limit of the territorial sea: the justifiable needs of coastal States;
the general interests of the international community; and the
interests of the maritime powers. The interests of coastal states
should be given priority and then the general interest of the
international community. The ROC also took the position that
the interests of the maritime powers should not be overlooked,
however, since many States whose maritime activities were
underdeveloped, in addition to the landlocked countries, de-
pended on these powers for essential services.56
In 1966-1967, several ministries and governmental agencies
of the ROC government again studied the questions of China's
territorial sea, fishing zone, contiguous zone and continental
shelf. After receiving their report, the Executive Yuan made
the following decision at its 1075th meeting, held on June 20,
1968:
531 U.N. CONF. ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFF. REC. 110 (1958). U.N. Doe. A/CoNF.
13/37.
" Id. When the ROC government considered its comments on the Draft Articles on the
Law of the Sea, the Chinese fishery industry expressed the view that the straight baseline
method in delimiting territorial sea should be adopted. See Our Fishing Industry's Recom-
mendations on the Law of the Sea, 74 Yu-Yu (Friends of Fisherman) 13 (Aug. 10, 1956).
Before 1958, almost all Chinese writers considered that territorial sea should be measured
from the low-water line along the coast.
561 U.N. CONr.. supra note 53.
5 Statement of Mr. Hsueh at the First Committee on March 11, 1958. 3 U.N. CON?. ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA, Orr. REc. 29 (1958), U.N. Doe. A/CoNr. 13/39.
At the Conference, the ROC voted against several proposals concerning the 12 nautical
mile limit, abstained on the Canadian amendment that the territorial sea could only be
extended to 6 nautical miles, and voted for a United States proposal that the territorial sea
should be 6 nautical miles. The United States proposal was rejected, having failed to obtain
the required two-thirds majority. Id. 175-180.
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(A) Concerning the question of the breadth of the
territorial sea, our country should have a flexible posi-
tion, and take measures in response to the need of na-
tional interest and international situation.
(B) Concerning the question of the breadth of the
fishing zone, our country should prescribe a 12 nautical
mile limit in order to protect our fishing resources and
in response to international trends. However, this
limit may be adjusted in response to the need of reci-
procity in international relations.
57
In the fall of 1969, the United States requested the ROC to
comment on a new US-USSR Draft Articles on the Law of the
Sea which provided, inter alia, that a coastal state may extend
the breadth of its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles and, for
a state which has a narrower breadth of the territorial sea, may
establish a fishing zone contiguous to its territorial sea. How-
ever, the total breadth of the territorial sea and fisheries zone
should not exceed 12 nautical miles. A preliminary study by the
ROC Foreign Ministry recommended that the ROC should accept
this rule.58
From the preceding historical examination, it is clear that the
ROC has not been satisfied with the traditional 3 mile limit
of the territorial sea. It has not, however, taken any action to
extend the breadth of its own territorial sea beyond this limit.
This cautious attitude may be due to two reasons. First, the ROC
has close relations with the United States which, until recently,
favored a limited territorial sea, while the Soviet Union, a coun-
try hostile to the ROC, has always favored an extended terri-
torial sea of 12 nautical miles. Therefore, the ROC has been
reluctant to take a position which would by necessary implication
support the Soviet Union and undermine the United States.
Second, since 1950, the effective area under ROC control has
been limited primarily to the Island of Taiwan at the same time
that the ROC has become a significant maritime power. It has
engaged in large-scale distant-water fishing, its fishing fleets op-
erating from the Indian Ocean through the South Pacific and
61 Information supplied by a reliable source.
58 Id. On December 4, 1970, the ROC delegate to the First Committee of the United Nations
General Assembly stated that "the Chinese delegation believes that the establishment of a
12-mile limit for the territorial sea to be embodied in a new treaty, as announced by
President Nixon in his declaration on United States ocean policy on 23 May 1970, is con-
sonant with customary international law as expounded by the International Law Commis-
sion in 1956." 25 GAOR First Comm., 1785th mtg., 8, U.N. Doe. A/C.1/PV.1785 (1970).
In 1956, the International Law Commission stated "that international law does not permit
an extension of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles." Report of the International Law
Commission Concerning the Work of Its Eighth Session, Articles Concerning the Latw of the
Sea, art. 3, para. 2, 11 GAOR Supp. 9, U.N. Doc. A/3169 (1957); reprinted in 51 Am. J.
INT'L LAW 161 (1957).
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into the Atlantic. In 1973, its deep-sea fishing fleets caught about
369,726 metric tons of fish, about half of its total fisheries pro-
duction.59 As of the end of 1973, the ROC had a merchant fleet
of 177 ships aggregating 2,148,238 dead weight tonnage
(D.W.T.) and manned by 30,065 Chinese seamen.60 Finally, the
ROC's shipbuilding industry ranks 15th in the world-the Tai-
wan Shipbuilding Corporation, since 1971, has had an annual
production capacity of up to 250,000 D.W.T. in shipbuilding, and
up to 1,500,000 D.W.T. in ship repairing.e1 As a major medium-
size maritime power, the ROC would not be benefited from an
expanded territorial sea.
4. The People's Republic of China and the Question of
China's Territorial Sea
Before 1958, the PRC's position on the scope of the territorial
sea was unclear. On July 17, 1952, the Soviet member of the
United Nations International Law Commission, F.I. Kozhevnikov,
observed that the PRC government "has so far made no ruling
on the width of its territorial waters. ' ' 62 Similarly, in June 1957,
a PRC writer, Wei Wen-han also observed: 'The breadth of our
territorial sea is not yet explicitly prescribed. However, at the
1930 Hague [Codification] Conference, the representative of old
China [ROC] did approve the 3 nautical mile breadth of terri-
torial sea. '"3
A textbook on criminal law prepared by the Central Political-
Legal Cadres School in Peking and published in September 1957
generally observed that the territorial sea can be either 3
or 12 nautical miles, but it did not specify whether China
adhered to the 3 or 12 nautical mile limit.64 With respect to
the method of delimiting the baseline of the territorial sea, the
1957 criminal law textbook noted generally that "the borderlines
[outer limit] of the [territorial sea] are to be drawn at a given
" CHINA YEARBOOK 1974, at 191.
ld. 227-228.
"' CHINA YEARBOOK 1972-1973, at 15, 272.
"( (1952] 1 Y.B. INT'L LAW COMM'N, supra note 46, at 153.
0 Wei Wen-han, Discussing the Question of the Width of the Territorial Sea, 3 FA HsUEH
(Science of Law) 25 (June 1, 1957).
6 CHUNG-HuA JEN-MIN KuNO-Ho-Kuo HSING-FA TSUNG-TSE CHIANS-I (Lectures on the
General Principles of Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China) 36 (Chung-yang
cheng-fa kan-pu hsueh-hsiao hsing-fa chiao-yen-shih [Teaching and Research Office for
Criminal Law of the Central Political-Legal Cadre's School] ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as
LECTURES], translated in 1 COHEN AND CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
DOCUMENTARY STUDY 321 (1974). Only after the PRC had declared its intention to extend
its territorial sea to twelve nautical miles on September 4, 1958 (see pp. 46-47 and note 75
infra) did a Chinese writer write: "Although the Kuomintang [Nationalist Party] government
once formally announced by Executive Yuan order that the scope of territorial sea was
three nautical miles, since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, it has never
recognized the formerly prescribed three nautical mile limit. In fact, the organs concerned
have acted on the principle of broader width on concrete matters." Chou Keng-sheng, The
Important Significance of Our Government's Declaration Concerning Territorial Sea, 18
SHIH-CHIEH CHIH-SHIH 16 (Sept. 20, 1958).
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distance from the low-water marks of the sea coast."6 5 This is the
so-called "normal baseline" method which was then used by most
countries.
However, in 1957 and early 1958, Chinese writers began to
question the wisdom of the traditional 3 nautical mile terri-
torial sea and the use of the normal baseline method to delimit it.
In Wei Wen-han's article, he observed: "How wide should the
breadth of our territorial sea be? This question should be decided
by jointly considering the concrete situation of our sea coast,
national defense and security, and the welfare of the people. The
author cannot give a definite figure, but under no circumstances
should it be less than 12 nautical miles."6 6 He also took note of
the straight baseline method of delimiting territorial sea used by
Norway and argued that the southern part of China's seacoast
was sufficiently indented and dotted with islands to justify ap-
plication of the straight baseline method in delimiting territorial
sea.67 Besides advocating an extended territorial sea and the use
of straight baseline method for China, Wei went further by
suggesting that:
Outside the scope of our territorial sea, if there are fish-
ing resources which have been fished by our people, our
country should, subject to freedom of navigation, claim
rights or establish prohibited zones over these areas, or
conclude agreements with the country or countries con-
cerned to protect the right of our fishermen.6S
On December 13, 1957, a declaration was issued by Indonesia
on the territorial sea, containing three major points:
1. The territorial sea was to be extended from 3 to 12
miles.
2. It was to be measured from straight baselines drawn from
the outermost points of the outermost islands of the
archipelago.
3. Waters within the straight baselines would be internal
waters, but open to innocent passage of foreign ships .6
The application of the declaration would have included as in-
ternal waters of Indonesia substantial areas between the islands
of Indonesian Archipelago hitherto considered high seas. The
Netherlands, United Kingdom, and other countries protested to
63 LECTURES, supra note 64, at 231.
06 Wei Wen-han, supra note 63, at 25.
6- Id. 26.
68 id.
I' Pengurnuman Penterintah Mengenai Wilajah Perairan Napara Republik Indonesia (Gov-
ernment Announcement of the Territorial Water of the Republic of Indonesia), Dec. 23,
1957, 2 THE JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 218 (1958); the majority of the
text is also reprinted in 4 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 284 (1965).
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the Indonesian government. The PRC, however, rushed to its
defense. An article in the December 28, 1957, authoritative
People's Daily, by "commentator," the pseudonym for a Commu-
nist Chinese official, denounced the British and Dutch protests. It
argued that Indonesia is a country comprising more than three
thousand islands and for reasons of security and prevention of
smuggling, it is necessary to include waters between islands as
internal waters. It also referred to the British practice of extend-
ing its jurisdiction to 24 nautical miles from the coast of St.
Helena Island when Napoleon was held there.'
0
Another article appeared in February, 1958, just a few weeks
before the opening of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the
Sea, categorically rejecting as "totally groundless" the alleged
United States and British claim that the 3 nautical mile ter-
ritorial sea is a "norm of international law." It observed that
"the practice of the great majority of states shows that the
breadth of territorial sea is freely decided by a state in accord-
ance with its historical usage, economic interest, and [national]
security." Although the article took note that there are different
methods for measuring the baseline, it observed that "in practice,
it is generally agreed that the baseline is the low-tide line."
7 1
Although the PRC was not invited to attend the Geneva Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea, held from February 24 to April
27, 1958, it appears that it watched closely the development of the
Law of the Sea before and during the Conference.7 2 Despite the
fact that the Conference approved use of the straight baseline
method in delimiting territorial sea 73 while failing to limit the
breadth of territorial sea to 6 nautical miles as proposed by the
United States,'7 4 the PRC waited until the fall of 1958 to articu-
late its claim of territorial sea.
On August 23, 1958, the PRC suddenly began a massive artil-
lery bombardment of Quemoy, an ROC-held island off the main-
land coast. Its air and naval forces soon joined the action. The
,OCommentator, Sovereignty Over Territorial Sea and "Freedom of the Sea," Jen-min
jih-pao (People's Daily), Dec. 28, 1957, at 5.
7'Ch'en Kang, "Territorial Waters" and "Internal Waters." 3 SHIH-CHIEH CHIH-SHIH
(World Knowledge) 31 (Feb. 5, 1958).
72 Draft Article of the Law of the Sea, Adopted by the United Nations International Law
Commission, July, 1956 [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMw'x 253 (1956), was translated into
Chinese and published in KUO-CHI KUNG-FA Ts'AN-K'AO WEN-CHIEN HSUAN-CHI (Compila-
tion of the Reference Documents of International Law) 254 (high seas), 265 (territorial
sea) (Wai-chiao hsueh-yuan [Institute of Diplomacy] ed. 1958). After the Conference, Com-
munist Chinese writers frequently referred to the document of the Conference to support
their arguments. E.g. Chou Keng-Sheng, supra note 64, at 16.
U Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Sept. 15, 1958, art. 4,
[1964], 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1608, T.I.A.S. 5639; 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 209.
" See p. 41 & note 56 supra. It should be noted that the Convention of the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone provided that "(t]he contiguous zone may not extend beyond
twelve [nautical] miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured." Id. art. 24, pars. 2, at 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1612, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 220. This provi-
sion seems to imply that the territorial sea may be extended beyond three miles, bt not
beyond twelve miles, leaving some room for a contiguous zone.
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United States gave the ROC force some limited logistic support
by escorting the ROC supply ships to the 3 mile limit off
Quemoy. On September 4, the PRC issued the following declara-
tion on China's territorial sea:
1. The breadth of the territorial sea of the People's Republic
of China shall be twelve nautical miles. This provision ap-
plies to all territories of the People's Republic of China,
including the Chinese mainland and its coastal island, as
well as Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghu
Islands, the Tungsha Islands, the Hsisha Islands, the
Chungsha Islands, the Nansha Islands, and all other islands
belonging to China which are separated from the mainland
and its coastal islands by the high seas.
2. China's territorial sea along the mainland and its coastal
islands takes as its baseline the line composed of the
straight lines connecting base-points on the mainland coast
and on the outermost of the coastal islands; the water area
extending twelve nautical miles outward from this baseline
is China's territorial sea. The water areas inside the base-
line, including Pohai Bay and the Chiungchow Strait, are
Chinese inland waters. The islands inside the baseline, in-
cluding Tungyin Island, Kaoteng Island, the Matsu Islands,
the Paichuan Islands, Wuchiu Island, the Greater and
Lesser Quemoy Islands, Tatan Island, Erhtan Island and
Tungting Island, are islands of the Chinese inland waters.
3. No foreign vessels for military use and no foreign aircraft
may enter China's territorial sea and the air space above
it without permission of the Government of the People's
Republic of China.
While navigating Chinese territorial seas, every foreign
vessel must observe the relevant laws and regulations laid
down by the Government of the People's Republic of China.
4. The principles provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 likewise
apply to Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghu
Islands, the Tungsha Islands, the Hsisha Islands, the
Chungsha Islands, the Nansha Islands, and all other is-
lands belonging to China.
The Taiwan and Penghu areas are still occupied by the
United States by armed force. This is an unlawful en-
croachment on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
the People's Republic of China. Taiwan, Penghu and such
other areas are yet to be recovered, and the Government of
the People's Republic of China has the right to recover
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these areas by all suitable means at a suitable time. This
is China's internal affair, in which no foreign interference
is tolerated.7
5
The Declaration included all ROC-held offshore islands within
PRC's territorial sea. The United States refused to recognize this
extension, saying it was an "attempt to cloak aggressive pur-
poses.' ' 7 On September 7, the United States Navy continued to
escort ROC supply ships to 3 nautical miles from Quemoy. 7- The
PRC responded by issuing a serious warning on the same day,
saying that "such an act, encroaching upon the sovereignty of
our country, is dangerous.
' ' 78
On October 6, 1958, the PRC Defense Minister Peng Tehhui
issued a statement to the "Taiwan compatriots" that it would
suspend the bombing of Quemoy for seven days, subject to the
condition that the U.S. would no longer provide naval escort for
supply ships to QuemoyY 9 On October 13, the suspension was ex-
tended for another two weeks. On October 20, on the eve of
United States Secretary of State Dulles' visit to Taipei, PRC
resumed its bombing of Quemoy on the ground that the "Taiwan
authorities" allowed United States naval escort in the Quemoy
"sea area."80 A few days later, on October 25, 1958, PRC an-
nounced an "even-day" cease-fire.8" This has been the military
situation in the Taiwan Strait up to the present.
In PRC's legal circle, writers rushed to the defense of PRC's
extension of territorial sea and the adoption of the straight
baseline method. Their arguments are based primarily on two
grounds. In the first place, they argued that it is within the sov-
ereign right of a state to decide the breadth of its territorial sea.
This does not mean that a state can arbitrarily make such a
decision. Professor Chou Keng-sheng was of the opinion that a
state "has the right to decide the breadth of its territorial sea
[by taking into consideration its] national defense, economic
interest, and geographical situation."' "8 Two other authors took a
more restrictive view. Kuo Chi wrote that a state has the "sov-
ereign right" to declare "a reasonable breadth of its territorial
sea." s3 Similarly, Fu Chu also wrote that "the breadth of the
. 1 PEKING REVIEW 21 (No. 28, Sept. 9, 1958).
' BARRACLOUGH. SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1956-1958, at 568 (1962).
"Id. 569.
5 CHUNG-HUA JEN-MIN KuNG-Ho-Kuo Tul-WAI KUAN-HsI WEN-CHIEN-CHI. (Collection
of Documents Relating to the Foreign Relations of the PRC) 169 (1959).
nId. 175-176.
s'Id. 181-182.
81 Id. 182-183. During the "even-day" cease-fire, the PRC refrained from shelling Quemoy
on even-numbered days.
12 Chou keng-sheng, supra note 64, at 16.
"Kuo Chi, Important Steps for Safeguarding the Sovereignty of the Country, 5 CIIENG-
FA YEN-CHIU (Studies in Political Science and Law) 9 (Oct. 14, 1958).
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territorial sea.., should be decided, within reasonable scope, in
accordance with the respective needs of [various] countries." 84
In the second place, they argued that the "three nautical miles
territorial sea" has never been a generally recognized principle
of international law. They referred to the practice of states8 5 and
the discussions at the 1930 Hague Codification Conference,86 the
United Nations International Law Commission S7 and the 1958
Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea.88
With respect to the use of straight baseline method in the PRC
declaration, the PRC writers relied on the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries Case, decided by the International Court of Justice,89
the 1956 Draft Articles on the Law of the Sea, the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and
the practice of various States, 0 to justify the use of this method
in delimiting China's territorial sea. However, PRC writers failed
to articulate why the Chinese coast would justify the use of this
method.91
After the crisis over Quemoy. had passed, the United States
articulated its legal ground for challenging PRC's Declaration
on China's Territorial Sea. In a speech delivered at the Washing-
ton Chapter of the Federal Bar Association on November 20,
1958, the Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs of
the State Department, Mr. Maurer, said:
FU CHU, KUAN-YU Wo-Kuo TI LING-HAI WEN-T'I (Concerning the Question of Our
Country's Territorial Sea) (1959), translated in I COHEN & CHIU, supra note 64, at 472.
5 E.g. Liu Tse-yung, A Major Step to Protect China's Sovereign Rights, 1 PEKING RE-
VIEW 11 (No. 29, Sept. 16, 1958):
"According to data gathered by the Secretariat of the Geneva Conference on the Law of
the Sea . . . 66 countries turned in reports on the present breadth of their territorial sea.
Twenty-one countries adhere to a breadth of three nautical miles . . . twelve have twelve
nautical miles . . ." See also Fu CHU, supra note 84, at 470; Chou Keng-sheng, supra note
64; Kuo Chi supra note 83, at 9.
. E.g. Liu Tse-yung, supra note 85, at 11:
"This question [of the breadth of territorial sea] was discussed at the First (Hague)
Conference for the Codification of International Law in 1930. Owing to the insistence of
Britain and the United States on the three mile limit the Conference failed to reach
agreement."
81 E.g., id. at 12:
"The eighth session of the Commission (1956) declared in 'The Articles Concerning the
Law of the Sea' it adopted that 'the Commission recognizes that the international practice
is not uniform as regards the delimitation of the territorial sea' and 'considers that inter-
national law does not permit an extension of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles.' In
other words, the Commission is of the opinion that a breadth of territorial sea not exceeding
twelve nautical miles is legitimate."
I E.g., Chou Keng-sheng, supra note 64:
"It. is worth noting that at the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea convened in
February this year [19581, in view of the majority of representatives of states opposed to
the 3 nautical mile breadth, the conference could not hut . . . make concessions by proposing
a six nautical mile breadth. Eight states, including the Soviet Union and the United Arab
Republic, proposed that each state has the right to decide the breadth of its territorial sea
within twelve nautical miles. The proposal was supported by a majority of the [participat-
ing] states. However, none of the proposals at the Conference was adopted for failing to
receive the required two-thirds majority and therefore, the law of the sea conference still
could not reach a conclusion on the breadth of territorial sea."
' [1951] I.C.J.116.
o E.g., Fu CHU, supra note 84, at 480; Chou Keng-sheng, supra note 64, at 16; Kuo Chi
supra note 83, at 10.
91E.g. Kuo Chi, supra note 83, at 10: "Our country's sea coast is indented and dotted
with many islands. It is obviously reasonable and necessary to adopt the straight baseline
method." Chou Keng-sheng, supra note 64, at 14, wrote that the geographical situation
of China's sea coast "is suitable for using the straight baseline."
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In addition, the United States considers that interna-
tional law recognizes only a 3-mile limit, that it is not
possible for a country, by unilateral action to take unto
itself that which is the common property of all nations,
and that this is, moreover, in violation of the univer-
sally accepted principle of the freedom of the high seas.
The United States' position finds support in the report
of the United Nations International Law Commission,
wherein it is stated that 'international law does not re-
quire states to recognize a breadth [of territorial sea]
beyond 3 miles.'
Further, a country is not free to choose whether its
territorial sea will be measured from the low-water
mark on the coast, which is the normal baseline, or
whether it will use straight baselines connecting salient
points or offshore islands. While Article 4 of the Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone adopted by the recent Geneva Conference on Law
of the Sea permits the establishment of straight base-
lines in localities where the coastline is deeply indented
and cut into or if there is a fringe of islands along the
coast in its immediate vicinity, it is clear that the
Chinese coast along which the straight lines described
in the statement of September 4 are drawn does not
conform to the geographic conditions which are set
forth in Article 4. There is even less legal basis for
drawing straight baselines from outermost points on a
group of islands and claiming waters thereby included
as internal waters. Similar attempts by other countries
to claim, as internal waters, large areas of high seas
within group of islands or archipelagoes have been
protested by many countries. The straight baselines
described in the statement of September 4, 1958, are
accordingly regarded by the United States as completely
arbitrary and without any basis in recognized interna-
tional law.92
Although the ROC has been allied with the United States since
195413 and welcomed the United States' naval escort for its supply
ships to 3 nautical miles off the coast of Quemoy, it was
92 The Legal Considerations Affecting the Status of Taiwan and the Offshore Islands,
[1958] AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: CURRENT DOCUMENTS 1189. 1198. For a discussion of the
PRC's Declaration on China's Territorial Sea, see Cheng Tao, supra note 6; Cheng Tao,
The Law of the Sea, in LAW IN CHINESE FORIIGN POLICY: COMMUNIST CHINA AND SE-
LECTED PROBLEMS OP INTERNATIONAL LAW 79. 82 (Shao-ehuan Leng and Hungdah Chiu eds.
1972).
0 Mutual defense Treaty with the Republic of China, Dec. 2, 1954, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 433,
T.I.A.S. No. 3178, 248 U.N.T.S. 213.
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silent on the legality of PRC's extension of the territorial sea
and the use of straight baseline methods.9 4 This attitude was
understandable, as was discussed above, in that the ROC itself,
on a number of occasions, was seriously considering extending
its territorial sea beyond 3 nautical miles and approved the
use of the straight baseline.
The post-1958 development on the Law of the Sea has been
favorable to the PRC's position. Not only have more and more
states extended their territorial sea beyond the 3 nautical mile
limit and used the straight baseline method,9 5 but the United
States has also gradually come to recognize the legality of the
12 mile territorial sea.96 In view of these recent developments, it
is submitted that even if the PRC's claim of a 12 nautical
mile territorial sea in 1958 was of questionable legality in inter-
national law, today the legality of such a claim appears beyond
doubt.
With respect to the PRC's use of the straight baseline method
in delimiting its territorial sea, the question does not concern
the legality of using such a method, which was accepted in the
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, but rather whether
PRC's application to the Chinese coast conforms to the require-
ments of that method. The answer to this question depends on
a study of the actual straight baselines drawn by the PRC on
the Chinese coast. Unfortunately, although the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
provided in Article 4, paragraph 6, that "the coastal state must
clearly indicate straight baselines on charts, to which due pub-
licity must be given," the PRC is not a party to the Convention
and so far has not made known how it drew straight baselines
on the Chinese coast. The following descriptions of the PRC's
baselines are primarily based on a study done by the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research of the State Department 7 and several
PRC publications.
Basically, it is observed by the State Department study that
the PRC "appears to have taken a realistic and non-expansive
attitude in drafting its straight baseline. Rather than stating
that the lines join the outermost points of the outer islands, the
" The military spokesman of the ROC said at a press conference sponsored by the Gov-
ernment Information Office on Sept. 5: "China's mainland is a part of the territory of the
Republic of China. All territorial sea [adjacent] to the mainland also belongs to the ROC."
KAN HUANG, supra note 29, at 77.
'5 INT'L BOUNDARY STUDY, sul'a note 44.
9International Law and the Ocean, 62 DEp'T STATE BULL. 339 (No. 1603, Mar. 16, 1970)
(Address by John R. Stevenson, the State Department Legal Advisor, to the Philadelphia
World Affairs Council and the Philadelphia Bar Association, Philadelphia, Feb. 18, 1970);
United States Outlines Position on Limit of Territorial Sea. id. at 343 (Press Release No.
64. Feb. 25, 1970). See p. 17 supra; p. 50 and note 172 infra; see generally. SWARZTRAUBER,
THE THREE-MILE LIMIT Or TERRITORIAL SEAS 229-248 (1972).
91 INT'L BOUNDARY STUDY. supra note 44. STRAIGHT BASELINES: PEOPLE'S REPUsLIC OF
CHINA 2 (No. 12, July, 1972).
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declaration notes [in paragraph 2] that mainland points inter-
vene." s,, Therefore, the PRC's declaration "would act to shorten
the length of straight baseline segments and hence to diminish
the claim to internal waters and to territorial sea."99
With respect to specific areas of sea coast, the Declaration
mentioned a number of areas where the straight baseline method
is applicable. This question requires expansion.
Gulfs or Bays. The Declaration pointed out that the Gulf of
Pohai (Pohai Bay or Gulf of Chili) is inside the baseline and is
China's internal waters. Geographically, Pohai is totally enclosed
by the Chinese provinces of Shangtung, Hopeh and Liaoning and
its mouth has a width of 45 nautical miles. However, the mouth
is fringed with islands which constitute eight entrances, and the
largest entrance is the entrance between Liaotung Peninsula in
the north and Pei Huang Chen Island (Lao Tieh Shan Water-
way), which has a breadth of 22.50 nautical miles. 1°o Article 7,
paragraph 4, of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone provides: "If the distance between
the low-water marks of the natural entrance points of a bay does
not exceed 24 [nautical] miles, a closing line may be drawn
between these two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed
thereby shall be considered as internal waters."''0 Therefore, it
is beyond doubt that the PRC can claim the Gulf of Pohai as
internal waters.70 2
Although the Declaration mentioned only the Gulf of Pohai, a
PRC writer correctly pointed out that the reason for this is that
it is the largest bay of China.10 3 It does not mean that the PRC
does not claim other bays as internal waters. It is impossible to
describe all other bays of China in an article of this nature, so
discussion will be limited to two other large and famous bays-
Hanchow Bay and the Gulf of Ch'u [Pearl] River Mouth.
In the central part of the Chinese coast, Hangchow Bay is
situated between the coast of Kiangsu and Chekiang provinces.
Its mouth has a width of approximately 50 nautical miles but is
fringed with the Chou-shan and the Sheng-szu Archipelagoes.
None of the distances between the islands exceeds 24 nautical
" Id.
SId.
1' Fu CHU, supra note 84, at 484.
2.1 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Sept. 15, 1958, art. 7, para.
4, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 210; FU CHU, supra note 84,
at 483.
102 A PRC writer also claimed the Gulf of Pohai as an historical bay of China. Fu CHU,
supra note 84, at 484; cf. p. 12 supra (ROC's position of the Gulf of Pohai). The validity
of this argument is now of purely academic interest; it will not be discussed here. Early
in this century some Chinese writers advocated the view of claiming the Gulf of Pohai as
China's territorial sea. See. e.g., The Theory of Claiming the Entire Gulf of Pohai as
China's Territorial Sea, 1 Ti-HSuEH TSA-CHIH (Geography Magazine) 43-44 (No. 5, June.
1910); see also references cited in KAN HUANG stepro note 29, at 79-80.
1 FU CHU, supra note 84, at 484.
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miles. According to a State Department study, the PRC draws a
baseline along the outermost islands of these two archipela-
goes.10 4
Another important bay is the Gulf of Ch'u [Pearl] River
Mouth in the southern part of the Chinese coast. Like the above
stated two bays, the mouth of this bay is fringed with many
islands, including the British-ruled Hong Kong and adjacent is-
lands. According to an undated notice issued by the PRC in
mid-1960, it is stated that "the waterway west of the Chiapeng
and the Tankan islands at the mouth of the Pearl [Ch'u] River
is part of China's inland [internal?] waters .... foreign vessels
are prohibited to sail in the waterways west of the Chiapeng
Tankan islands."105 It is reasonably assumed that PRC has drawn
straight baselines connecting the outermost points of these is-
lands. The lines would, however, enclose Macao as an enclave
within PRC internal waters. The PRC might also have chosen
to enclose Hong Kong by continuing the Tankan line eastward
but apparently has specifically not taken this action.10 6
Straits. The Declaration points out in paragraph 2 that the
Chiungchow strait is part of China's internal waters.1 07 The
strait separates the Leichow (Luichow) Peninsula and Hainan
Island and links the South China Sea with the Gulf of Tonkin.
The distance between its natural entrance points is about 40
miles long, and the narrowest width is 9.8 nautical miles.110  By
claiming a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, the strait would
be part of PRC's territorial sea. However, the PRC was not satis-
fied with such a claim and has gone further by claiming it as
internal waters. Fu Chu justified the PRC's claim by saying:
"When a coastal state adopts the straight baseline method to
delimit the breadth of its territorial sea, if a strait is inside the
baseline, then this strait should be the internal strait of the
coastal state. Our Chiungchow strait is this kind of strait be-
cause it is situated inside the baseline of our territorial sea.' 0 °
However, in view of the fact that the strait was being used by
foreign vessels as an international waterway, the PRC made a
114 See the map entitled "Taiwan to Korea" annexed to STRAIGHT BASELINES: THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 97.
"s Id. 3.
206 On April 21, 1968, two Americans, Mary Ann Harbert and Gerald Ross McLaughlin,
were arrested on their yacht by the PRC at Tankan (Tamkon) Island for "illegally intrud-
ing into China's territorial waters." China's Organs of Dictatorship Dispose of Cases of
U.S. Culpvrits, 14 PEKING Rvvmw 23 (No. 51, Dec. 17, 1971). McLaughlin committed suicide
on March 7, 1969, while under PRC confinement, and Harbert was released on Dec. 13,
1971. Id. For a detailed account, see HARsERr. CAPTIVITY, How I SURVIVED 44 MONTHS As
A PRISONER OF THE RED CHINESE (1973) (as told to Einstein).1i Declaration on China's Territorial Sea, pp. 46-47 and note 75 supra.108 Kennedy, A Brief Geographical and Hydrographical Study of Straits which Constitute
Routes for International Traffic, U.N. Doe. A/CoNP. 13/6 and Add. 1 (Oct. 23, 1957), in 1
U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 114, 125 (text), 162 (map), U.N. De. A/
CONF. 13/37 (1958). The Chiungchow Strait is also known as the Hainan Strait.
" Fu CHU, supra note 84, at 486.
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concession by allowing foreign non-military vessels to continue
to pass through the strait if they comply with the PRC's "Rules
Regulating Passage of Foreign Nonmilitary Vessels Through
the Chiungchow Strait," promulgated on June 5, 1964.110 Ar-
ticle 3 of the Rules defines the strait water area as being bounded
"provisionally" by a line joining Mu-lan-tao lightpost (about
20'9'37"P north latitude and 110041 ' east longitude) and Sheng-
kou-hou-sha lightpost (about 20026 ' north latitude and
110030'22"P east longitude) on the east and by a line joining
Chiao-wei-chiao lightpost (about 20013'30" north latitude and
109055'30"P east longitude) and the Lin-Kao-chiao lightpost
(about 2000'22"t north latitude and 109042'6 " east longitude) on
the west. Presumably, these two lines are the straight baselines
for the strait.
Another important strait is the Taiwan Strait which separates
the mainland province of Fukien and the island province of
Taiwan. The widest distance of the strait is about 110 nautical
miles, and the narrowest distance is about 70 nautical miles. The
Penghu (Pescadores) Archipelogo lies in the eastern side of the
strait, and the nearest distance between this Archipelago and
Taiwan is less than 24 nautical miles. From the language in the
declaration, it appears very clear that a separate straight base-
line system would be drawn about the two island groups of
Taiwan and Penghu if they were placed under the control of
the PRC. So far it appears that the PRC has not yet tried to
draw a straight baseline for these ROC controlled islands, nor
has it issued "serious warnings" when foreign warships enter
the sea area between 3 and 12 nautical miles off the coast of
these islands.
South China Sea Islands. Paragraph 4 of the Declaration pro-
vides that the straight baseline principle would be applied to the
four Chinese archipelagoes-, in the South China Sea: The
Tungsha (Pratas), Hsisha (Paracel Islands), the Chungsha
(Macclesfield Bank) and the Nansha (Spratly Islands). The
Tungsha Islands under the control of the ROC is a small atoll
and its coast is not deeply indented. There appears no justifiable
legal ground to use the straight baseline principle here.112
The Chungsha Islands are submerged features which do not
qualify as islands either geographically or legally. The question
of its territorial sea certainly does not exist. Moreover, it is
UORules Regulating Passage of Foreign Nonmilitary Vessels through the Chiungchow
Strait. Jen-min jihopao (People's Daily), June 28, 1964, at 2.
m Declaration on China's Territorial Sea, pp. 46-47 and note 75 supra.
112 STRAIGHT BASEUNES: THE PEOPLE'S REPuBLIc OF CHINA, supra note 97, at 3.
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
questionable whether a state can claim ownership over a mid-
ocean sea-bed area.
The Spratly Islands are generally under the control of the
ROC, though it has been reported that the Philippines and South
Vietnam also occupy a few islets of this island group.1'" The
whole group, including at least 98 islands, islets or shoals, is
widely spread between 11o30 ' and 40 north latitude and
109°30 ' and 117o50' east longitude. The distance between the
largest island Taiping (Itu Aba) and the second largest island
Nanwei (Spratly or Storm) is about 160 nautical miles, though
many islets intervene. A State Department study is of the
opinion that "because of their small size and wide dispersion
[the Spratlies would] defy any logical system of straight base-
line."'1." However, it is submitted that the question of appli-
cability of straight baseline to the Spratlies would much de-
pend on the distance between islets or shoals of this group and
pending a thorough investigation of the matter, it is difficult to
give a definite answer.
The Paracel Islands, though claimed by the Republic of
Vietnam for some time, is now totally under the control of the
PRC."15 A State Department study based on warnings given by
the PRC against intrusions into claimed PRC territorial sea of
the Paracels indicated several straight baselines on the eastern
side of the Paracels. 16 However, it is not clear how the PRC
draws other straight baselines on the western side of the
Paracels.
Although the PRC supported the Indonesian measures in 1957
to draw baselines from the outermost points of the outermost
islands of the Indonesian archipelago, it does not appear that it
attempts to apply this so-called archipelago principle to China's
South China Sea islands. 11
It is impossible to describe how the PRC draws straight base-
lines in other coastal areas of China. Therefore, a map based on
all available information to this author was drawn to show the
" It was reported that the Philippines had occupied Nanshan, Thitu and Flat islands for
some time. The ROC had occupied the largest island, Taiping (Itu Aba), since 1951, and
the Republic of Vietnam has occupied the Nanwei Islands (Storm or Spratly) since early
1974. See Chiu and Park, Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, in OIL AND
ASIAN RIVALs, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs. 93rd Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., at 422 (1974).
1. STRAIGHT BASELINES: PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC O CHINA, supra note 97, at 4.
2S The Republic of Vietnam occupied Robert and Prattle islands of the Paracel Island
group for some time, but, in January, 1974, the PRC drove out the Vietnamese occupation
force. See Chiu and Park, supra note 113, at 422.
16 See map entitled "People's Republic of China: Hypothetical Straight Baseline," an.
nexed to STRAIGHT BASELINES: PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, aupra note 97.
511, should be pointed out that both the PRC and the ROC maps have usually drawn
a boundary line outside the South China Sea Islands. This line is drawn for the purpose
of identifying those islands as Chinese territory and does not mean that the sea areas
within the boundary line are China's territorial or internal sea.
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PRC's baselines of territorial sea for reference to readers.
Whether these lines actually reflect the PRC's system of straight
baseline remains to be studied.
The breadth at which the PRC delimits its territorial sea, of
course, has a critical effect upon the existence of related legal
rights such as the right of innocent passage by foreign vessels
and the right of overflight above the territorial sea by foreign
aircraft. It is interesting, therefore, to examine the position
taken by the 1958 Declaration with respect to these issues. Para-
graph 3 of the Declaration provides for innocent passage by
non-military vessels, subject to observance of relevant laws and
regulations." "' While, in principle, this provision is similar to
Article 17 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial
Sea, 1 9 whether in practice there is any discrepancy between the
two would depend on the relevant laws and regulations of the
PRC.120 The Declaration also denies the passage of military
vessels through the territorial sea and the overflight of foreign
aircraft through the airspace above the territorial sea unless
permission is granted by the PRC.
It is generally recognized that foreign aircraft do not enjoy
the right of innocent passage through the airspace above the
territorial sea.12 1 However, whether foreign warships are en-
titled to enjoy the right of innocent passage through the terri-
torial sea is controversial in international law. Article 23 of the
1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contigu-
ous Zone is unclear on this point. It provides: "If any warship
does not comply with the regulations of the coastal state con-
cerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any
request for compliance which is made to it, the coastal state may
require the warship to leave the territorial sea.' 122 Many Afro-
Asian-Soviet bloc states have, on ratifying the Convention,
made reservations asserting the coastal state's right to require
warships to seek previous authorization before passing through
the territorial sea. 23 The United States, while challenging the
PRC's right to unilaterally extend its territorial sea to 12
"' Declaration on China's Territorial Sea, p. 22 and note 75 supra.
' "Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage shall comply with the laws
and regulations enacted by the coastal state in conformity with [articles 14 through 17 of
the Convention] .... " Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Sept.
15, 1958, art. 17, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1611, T.I.A.S. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 216.
1" It is not clear whether the PRC has made known its pertinent laws and regulations,
if any exist, to the outside world. The official CHUNG-YANG JEN-MIN CHENG-Fu FA-LiNG
HuI-PIEN (Collection of laws and decrees of the Central People's Government, 7 vols, 1950.
1955) and CHUNG-HUA JEN-MIN KUNG-Ho-Kuo FA-KuE HuI-PIEN (Collection of Laws and
Regulations of the People's Republic of China, 13 vols., 1956-1965) do not contain such laws
or regulations.
"'E.g., BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 427 (3rd ed. 1971).
u2 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Sept. 15, 1958, art. 23,
(1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1612, T.I.A.S. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 220.
1" FRIEDMANN, LISSITZYN, & PUGH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 597
(1969).
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nautical miles, did not seem to protest PRC's measure for entry
of military vessels into its territorial sea.
12
4
It must be pointed out that the right of foreign warships to
enter Chinese ports and territorial seas was considered by the
Chinese as an important item in the unequal treaties. 12 -5 As Presi-
dent Chiang Kai-shek of the ROC observed:
The Treaties of Tientsin signed with Britain, the
United States, France and Russia, permitted foreign
war vessels to enter any harbor and anchor at all treaty
ports.126 Other nations came to enjoy the same privi-
lege by virtue of the most-favored-nation clause. With
territorial waters and inland rivers thus opened to
foreign war vessels, China could well be called 'a house
with gates wide open', and foreign powers were free to
do whatever they liked. Inasmuch as the ports where
foreign nationals concentrated were generally cities
economically well developed, and politically and cul-
turally rather advanced, foreign naval forces in the
event of any incident could, by merely clearing their
decks for action, readily intimidate the Chinese people
and officials, the Central Government or the local au-
thorities, into accepting whatever they demanded.
Under pressure of this 'gun-boat policy' China could
only do as she was bidden. 2 7
On January 11, 1943, a Treaty for the Relinquishment of
Extraterritorial Rights in China and the Regulations of Related
Matters was signed between the United States and the ROC."
The accompanying exchange of notes No. 1 explicitly provided
for the abrogation of special rights with regard to the entry of
American naval vessels into Chinese waters."2 9 From then on,
warships of China and the United States, when exchanging
visits, would be accorded reciprocal courtesies in accordance
with international usage. Afterwards, similar rights enjoyed by
warships of other countries were also abrogated. On October
19, 1946, the ROC government promulgated Provisional Meas-
ures Governing the Entry of Foreign Warships into Chinese
11 P. 47 and note 76 supra.
Im Hungdah Chiu, Comparison of the Nationalist and Communist Chinese Views of Un-
equal Treaties, in CHINA'S PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME CASE STUDIES 239, 250-
251, 260 (J. Cohen ed. 1972).1
"0 E.g., Article 52 of the Sino-British Treaty of Tientsin (June 26, 1858), 1 H--STLET'S
CHINA TREATIES 34 (3rd ed. 1908): "British ships of war coming for no hostile purpose,
or being engaged in the pursuit of pirates, shall be at liberty to visit all ports within the
dominions of the Emperor of China .... "
= CHIANG KAI-SHEK. CHINA'S DESTINY 60 (Wang Chung-hui trans. 1947).
128 Treaty with the Republic of China for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights
in China and the Regulation of Related Matters, Jan. 11, 1943, 57 Stat. 767 (1943), T.S.
No. 984.
Ifd. 789.
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Territorial Seas and Ports,13 0 which provided that entry is sub-
ject to prior permission.
No country appears to have protested the legality of the
measures.
5. The PRC and the Recent Development of the Regime of the
Territorial Sea, Economic Zone and Continental Shelf
After mid-1959, the PRC's interest in the question of the terri-
torial sea appeared to be in decline. When the Second United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was held in the
spring of 1960, the PRC seemed simply to ignore the Con-
ference. It was neither reported in the authoritative People's
Daily nor commented upon in the legal or international affairs
journals such as Chen-fa-yen-chiu (Studies in political science
and law), Shih-chieh chih-shih (World knowledge) or Kuo-chi
iven-ti yen-chiu (Studies in international problems).
During the 1960's, the PRC's activities on the question of the
territorial sea continued to be very limited. Except for promul-
gating the above-mentioned Rules concerning Chiungchow
Strait,131 its activities were limited primarily to giving "serious
warnings" to "American imperialism" for violating the PRC's
"territorial sea." Taking the year of 1963 for example, the PRC
gave fifteen "serious warnings" to the United States for alleged
intrusions into its territorial sea by its warships or military air-
crafts. It also gave five "serious warnings" for alleged intrusions
into its "sea areas" (hai-yu) .132
Another significant action of the PRC was its strong protest
against American proclamation of a "combat zone" off the
Vietnamese coast in 1965. On April 24, 1965, President Johnson
designated Vietnam and the waters adjacent to it as "an area
in which armed forces of the United States are and have been
engaged in combat."1 3 This "combat zone" extended eastwardly
to 1110 east longitude, which is about 9 nautical miles off the
coast of Triton (Chung-chien) Island of the Paracels (Hsisha) .34
The PRC responded by publishing an article by "Observer," a
pseudonym for a senior Communist Chinese official, denouncing
the act as "a menace to China's security and an encroachment
on China's sovereignty," because the zone "extends to the very
Z' See the translation of selected articles in LAW AND REGULATIONS ON THE REGIME OF
THE TERRITORIAL SEA 367, U.N. Legislative Series, ST/LEo/SEE. B/6, Dec. 1956.
2'B Rules Regulating the Passage of Foreign Nonmilitary Vessels through the Chiungchow
Strait, supra note 110.
22See the listing of these serious warnings in I-CHIu LIU-SAN NIEN JEN-MIN JFH-PAo
So-YIN (Index of 1963 People's Daily) 288 (Jen-min jih-pao t'u-shu kuan ed. 1965). It is
not clear whether the term "sea areas" refers to PRC's internal waters, or to areas con-
tiguous to the territorial sea.
U3 Exec. Order No. 11,216, 30 Fed. Reg. 5817 (1965).
"4 Id.
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door of China and -even includes part of Chinese territorial
waters in the vicinity of China's Hsisha Islands."'' 5
Subsequently, the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) de-
clared a 3 nautical mile "defensive area" and a 12 nautical mile
"supervisory belt" for the purpose of preventing "the infiltration
by sea of (Vietcong) personnel and supplies." It would "inspect
and search" ships passing through these areas. This was de-
nounced by the PRC's Political Science and Law Association as
a measure instigated by "American imperialism . . ., infringing
on the PRC's territorial sovereignty and freedom of navigation
on the seas."' 3 6 It did not articulate why the Republic of Vietnam
could not extend its jurisdiction beyond 3 nautical miles off its
coast. Presumably, the PRC seemed to consider the Republic of
Vietnam an American "puppet" and therefore had no legal right
to take such measures on behalf of Vietnam.'
3 7
It was not until the early 1970's that the PRC gradually re-
newed its interest in the question of the territorial sea and other
problems relating to the law of the sea. The focal point of the
PRC's present interest, however, is not primarily on China's own
territorial sea problem but on supporting developing countries'
desire to expand their territorial sea right or maritime right up
to 200 nautical miles. 1 38 The first significant PRC action was an
editorial entitled "Support Latin American Countries' Struggle
to Defend Their Territorial Sea Rights" appearing in the au-
thoritative People's Daily on November 20, 1970."39 In the edi-
torial, the PRC committed itself to support the 200 nautical mile
breadth of territorial sea right claimed by Latin American
countries by saying:
The Chinese people- ° regard the struggle of the Latin
American countries and people against U.S. imperialist
aggression as their own struggle. They express firm
support for the Latin American countries and people
in their struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression
and in defense of the rights of territorial seas.' 4'
-5 Observer, Johnson Administration's Act of Piracy, Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily)
May 2, 1965, at 2; translated in 8 PEKING REvrEw 23 (No. 19, May 7, 1965).
13 Statement of Chinese Political Science and Law Association Condemning the Piratical
Acts of the Johnson Administration's Combat Area Declaration, 2. CsENG-FA YEN-CHIUI
(Studies in Political Science and Law) 6 (1965), translated in 2 COHEN AND CHIU, supra
note 64, at 1499.
ul On January 18, 1950, the Foreign Minister of the PRC notified the North Vietnamese
Foreign Minister that the PRC "recognizes the Government of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam [North Vietnam] as the legal government representing the will of the Vietnamese
people." 1 CHUNG-HUA JEN-MIN KUNO-Ho Kuo Tui-WAi KUAN-HSI WEN-CHIEN CHI,
supra note 78, at 24 (1957).
m See note 1 supra, regarding the distinction between the use of the terms "territorial
sea right" and "maritime right."
us Translated in 18 PEKING Rvi 7-8 (No. 13, Nov. 27, 1970).
140 In the terminology of the PRC, "the Chinese People" means the government of
the PRC.
2' Support Latin American Countries' Struggle to Defend their Territorial Sea Rights,
supra note 139. at S.
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The PRC's support became increasingly official. For example,
in mid-1971 when some Peruvian cabinet members visited the
PRC, Premier Chou En-lai "reiterated the firm support of the
government of the People's Republic of China for Peru and other
Latin American countries in their struggle to persist in defend-
ing their rights over 200 nautical mile territorial waters and their
maritime jurisdiction. '1 2 Subsequently, the PRC included such a
commitment in the documents establishing diplomatic relations
with several Latin American countries. Thus, in the joint com-
munique announcing its establishment of diplomatic relations
with Peru on November 2, 1971, the PRC stated that it recog-
nized "the sovereignty of Peru over the maritime zone adjacent
to its coast within the limit of 200 nautical miles."1' 3 The joint
communique announcing establishment of diplomatic relations
with Argentina on February 13, 1972, contained a similar dec-
laration.1 44 It should be noted that the term "territorial sea" was
not used in these documents.
Despite the PRC's support for a 200 nautical mile territorial
sea right or maritime zone off the coast, it did not articulate its
legal grounds for supporting such a claim until it replaced the
ROC delegation at the United Nations and was elected to the
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed
and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction
(hereinafter referred to as Seabed Committee). In his first speech
before the Seabed Committee on March 3, 1972, the PRC repre-
sentative An Chih-yuan attacked the hegemonism of the super-
powers in attempting to limit the breadth of the territorial sea,
and based the legality of the 200 mile extension on state sover-
eignty:
The superpowers have tried hard to find pretexts in
international law for their own defense. First, they as-
serted that 'the breadth of the territorial seas of states
has been defined by international law to be three nauti-
cal miles.' Then, under the pressure of circumstances,
they changed their tune and said that it should be 12
nautical miles. By this they attempt to attack the Latin
American countries' proclamation of 200 nautical miles
as 'violation of international law.' But this is of no avail.
As everyone with some knowledge of international law
is aware, there has never been in history a unified and
internationally recognized breadth of territorial seas.
32 Peruvian Minister of Fisheries Visits China, 14 PEKING REVIEW 4 (No. 26, June 25,
1971).1
" Joint Communique on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and Peru.
14 PEKING REvIEW 5 (No. 45, Nov. 5, 1971).
I" Diplomatic Relations Established between China and Argentina, 15 PEKING REVIEW 26
(Nos. 7-8, Feb. 25, 1972).
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
The breadth of the territorial sea of each country in the
world is determined by the country itself, and this is
within its state sovereignty. With regard to the breadth
of territorial seas of various countries in the world,
there are at present more than ten different stipula-
tions, ranging from 3 to 200 nautical miles. What is most
ridiculous is that when a superpower says 3 nautical
miles today, others must not say no; when tomorrow it,
in collusion with the other superpower, says the breadth
must not exceed 12 nautical miles, others have again to
follow suit. By this logic, only the superpowers have the
final say, while the other one hundred and scores of
countries in the world can only submissively obey and
let themselves be trampled upon at will. Can this be
'international law'! It is crude violation of the principle
of state sovereignty. It is imperialist logic, pure and
simple ....
We hold that it is within each country's sovereignty
to decide the scope of its rights over territorial seas.
All coastal countries are entitled to determine reason-
ably the limits of their territorial seas and jurisdiction
according to their geographical conditions, taking into
account the needs of their security and national eco-
nomic interests and having regard for the requirement
that countries situated on the same seas shall define the
boundary between their territorial seas on the basis of
equality and reciprocity.
We maintain that all coastal countries have the right of
disposal of their natural resources in their coastal seas,
sea-bed, and the subsoil thereof so as to promote the
well-being of their people and the development of their
national economic interests.1'4
The speech did not specify the exact limit of the breadth of
a country's territorial sea and only said that a country "(is)
entitled to determine reasonably the limits of (its) territorial
sea.. . ." However, a month later the authoritative People's Daily
defined the term "territorial sea" in its column on International
Knowledge as follows:
The territorial sea is a part of the sea area extended to
a designated width from the low-water line or the se-
lected baseline (called baseline of the territorial sea)
14 Speech by An Chih-Yuan, Representative of the PRC, at the U.N. Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdic-
tion, Mar. 3, 1972, 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 654, 657, 660 (1972).
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along the entire coast of a coastal state and is under the
sovereign jurisdiction of that state. At present, the
width of the territorial sea of coastal states (also called
littoral states) of the world is extremely inconsistent.
Their width starts from 3 nautical miles and may be
extended to 4, 6, 10, 12, 18, 25, 30, 130 and up to 200
nautical miles.240
The mentioning of 200 nautical miles in the above definition
of territorial sea may imply that the PRC considers that this
should be the limit of the breadth of territorial sea.
At the United Nations, the PRC actively supports the claim
for 200 nautical mile maritime right,'4 which allows a state to
create an exclusive economic zone beyond a country's territorial
sea up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline of the territorial
sea. On March 20, 1973, PRC Chief Representative Chung Yen
spoke at the Subcommittee II of the Seabed Committee:
Owing to the fact that the breadth of the territorial
sea varies with different countries, we consider that it
is in the exercise of the sovereignty of a state to reason-
ably define, in accordance with their specific conditions
and the need for the development of their natural
economies, the scope of their jurisdiction over economic
resources beyond their territorial seas, using the names
of exclusive economic zone, continental shelf, patri-
monial sea or fishing zone, etc. Neighbouring countries
situated in a common sea area should equitably allot
their limits of jurisdiction through consultations on the
basis of equality and mutual respect.
48
He explained the different legal status of the territorial sea and
economic zone as follows:
Territorial sea is a part of the territory of a coastal
state over which it exercises complete sovereignty. In
the case of an exclusive economic zone, the coastal
state mainly enjoys ownership over the economic re-
sources therein, including living resources and sea-bed
natural resources. . . .In order to protect, utilize, ex-
plore and exploit the resources therein it is necessary
for the coastal state to exercise exclusive jurisdiction
'4 Kno-eki chih-shih (International Knowledge), Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily) Apr.
12, 1972, at 6, in 1 COHEN AND CHIu, stpra note 64, at 491.
147 Supra note 1.
"A Speech by Chinese Chief Representative Chuang Yen at Subcommittee II, at 6
(People's Republic of China, Mission to the U.N., undated Press Release): summarized in
Chinese Delegate Chuang Yen Speaks at Subcommittee Meeting of U.N. Sea-bed Committee,
RSINHUA WEEKLY 5 (No. 13, Mar. 26, 1973).
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over the area and the right to take necessary measures
and promulgate appropriate laws and regulations to
protect these resources against plunder, appropriation,
destruction or pollution.... Other countries can engage
in activities in the exclusive economic zone of a given
country only when they have secured its consent by
concluding necessary agreements with it through con-
sultations on an equal footing and on the basis of respect
for its sovereignty. Moreover, they should strictly ob-
serve its relevant regulations and measures. They enjoy
the convenience of normal navigation and overflight
through its exclusive economic zone provided they do
not prejudice its security, or affect its fishing activities
and its exploration and exploitation of seabed resources
therein.1 49
With respect to the right of a land-locked country neighboring a
coastal state, Chung Yen suggested that the latter "should, in
principle, grant to its neighboring land-locked state common en-
joyment in certain proportion of the rights of ownership and
jurisdiction in its economic zone."150
It should be pointed out that the designation of a portion of
high sea contiguous to its territorial sea as a special zone similar
to economic zone is not new to the PRC. In late December 1950,
the PRC issued regulations that prohibited all fishing by trawl-
ers, whether Chinese or foreign, in a zone that seemed to extend
from China's Korean border to Chekiang Province and that ap-
peared to be broader even than the 12 nautical mile territorial sea
later claimed by the PRC in 1958..51 When on April 15, 1955, the
Chinese Fisheries Association (CFA) and its Japanese counter-
part, the Japan-China Fishing Council (JCFC) concluded an "un-
official agreement" on fishing in Yellow Sea and East China Sea,
letters were exchanged between them in which the CFA notified
the JCFC of this trawler-prohibited zone as including the sea
area west of the line running from a point at 37020 ' N and
123003 ' E to a point at 36049'10 , , N and 122043' E, then to a
point at 3501 ' N and 120038 ' E then to a point at 30044' N and
123023 ' E, and finally to a point at 290 N and 122045' E. More-
over, the same letter also notified the Japanese side that the PRC
had designated the sea area west of the line running from a point
10 Id.
IO Id. 7.
M' Tao Cheng, The Law of the Sea, in LAW IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: COMMUNIST
CHINA AND SELECTED PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 93-94, 111 (1972), citing the Annex
to the "Temporary Regulations Concerning Motorized Trawler Fishing in the East China
Sea" issued by the Aquatic Products Control Board of the East China Military-Political
Commission on December 16, 1950, 2 HuA-TUNG CH'U TS'AI-CHENG CHING-CHI FA-LING
HUI-PIEN (Collection of laws and decrees of the East China area regarding financial and
economic matters) 1333-1337 (PRC).
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at 39O4548" N and 124010 , E to a point at 37o20' N and 123003'
E as a military security zone. Japanese fishing boats "are not
allowed to sail into this area without permission of the compe-
tent department of the Chinese government."' 5 2 Both zones in-
cluded a substantial portion of the high seas contiguous to
China's territorial sea even assuming at that time the PRC had
already claimed a 12 nautical mile territorial sea. The Japanese
side accepted these measures on the understanding that they
"are applicable to all boats irrespective of their nationality and
are not merely intended for Japanese fishing boats."'1 3 On No-
vember 9, 1963, similar letters were again exchanged between
the CFA and JCFC.154
Before the same Subcommittee, the PRC severely criticized
the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea which adopted
the four conventions on territorial sea, high sea, continental
shelf and conservation of fishing resources. The PRC repre-
sentative Shen Wei-liang told the Subcommittee II of the Seabed
Committee on March 29, 1973:
It must be pointed out that, in 1958 when the First Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea was held, many Asian and
African countries had not yet won independence. Asian,
African and Latin American countries made up only
about half of the eighty-odd countries then par-
ticipating in the Conference. And owing to manipulation
by the imperialist powers, their many reasonable propo-
sitions were not adopted. Thus, the four Geneva Con-
ventions have completely failed to reflect truly the
reasonable demands of the numerous developing coun-
tries. In the decade and more since then, profound
changes have taken place in the world situation. All
countries, big or small, should be equal. International
affairs should be settled by all countries through consul-
tations on an equal footing. Opinions of the Third
World should be fully respected. The representatives of
many countries have now pointed out that the four Con-
ventions do not meet the needs of our epoch and should
be rewritten.255
With respect to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone, Shen Wei-liang was particularly un-
232 4 CHUNO-HUA JEN-MIN KUNG-Ho-Kuo T'IAO-YUEH-CH1 (Compilation of Treaties of
the People's Republic of China) 280-281 (1958), trans. in 1 COHEN AND CHIU, supra 64,
at 550.
"'Id. 282; 550.
,1s For text, see 1 COHEN AND CHIU, supra note 64, at 549-551.
"' Press Release, People's Republic of China Mission to the United Nations [no date],
1.2. Whole speech summarized in Chinese Representative Speaks at Snb-committee of U.N.
Sea-bed Committee. HSiNHUA WEEKLY 17-18 (No. 15, Apr. 9, 1973).
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happy about three articles of the Convention. First, Article 24,
paragraph 2, which set the limit of contiguous zone so as not to
exceed "twelve (nautical) miles from the baseline from which
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured," was considered
by Shen as "a so-called legal basis" used by the superpowers
(the United States and the Soviet Union) to oppose "the devel-
oping countries in their struggle to defend their territorial sea
rights" (i.e., to expand their territorial sea or contiguous zone
beyond 12 nautical miles.) Second, Shen said that Article 14 was
drafted in such general terms that ships of all countries would
enjoy the right of innocent passage through territorial seas, and
therefore, it "may be interpreted that foreign military ships
enjoy the same right." Finally, Shen said of Article 16 which
stipulates that there shall be no suspension of the innocent pas-
sage of foreign ships through straits which are used for inter-
national navigation, "this blatantly deprives coastal states with
such straits of the right to exercise sovereignty over their own
territorial seas," and allows "foreign warships and submarines
(to) intrude unimpedely into the straits within the territorial
sea limits of coastal states in disregard of their security."'156
On July 16, 1973, the PRC consolidated its above stated view
into a working paper and submitted it to Subcommittee II of the
Seabed Committee. 15 7 The paper is divided into three parts: 1.
Territorial sea, 2. Exclusive Economic Zone or Exclusive Fishery
Zone, and 3. Continental Shelf.
The working paper provides that the territorial sea "as delim-
ited by a coastal state by virtue of sovereignty," is "a specified
area of sea adjacent to its coast or internal waters, including
the airspace over the territorial sea and its bed and subsoil
thereof, over which it exercises sovereignty."R With respect to
the breadth of the territorial sea, it provides that a coastal state
"is entitled to reasonably define the breadth . . . according to its
geographical features and its needs of economic development and
national security," and that it should pay "due regard to the
legitimate interests of its neighboring countries and the con-
venience of international navigation, and shall give publicity
thereto."'159 Although the PRC working paper does not put a limit
on the breadth of territorial sea, the second part of the working
paper on the economic zone provides that the "outer limit of the
economic zone may not, in maximum, exceed 200 nautical miles
measured from the baseline of the territorial sea."160 Therefore,
1 Id. 2-3.
57 U.N. Doe. A/A.C. 188/Sc. II/L.34 (1973), reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1231-1234 (1975).
3= Id
= Id.
360Id. 2.
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it may be reasonably concluded that the PRC considers the
maximum breadth of the territorial sea should be 200 nautical
miles.161
The working paper is silent on the use of the straight baseline
method to delimit the territorial sea. In view of the PRC's prac-
tice and the adoption of this method by the 1958 Convention on
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, this omission should
not be interpreted as a denial of the validity of the straight base-
line method of delimitation. Although the PRC clearly accepts
the notion that a country must publicize the delimitation of its
territorial sea, what publication it considers adequate is unclear.
If it considers that a state using the straight baseline should indi-
cate the lines on charts and furnish them to other countries, it is
clear the PRC's practice has not satisfied this condition. Although
the PRC announced its territorial sea breadth and the use of the
straight baseline method in 1958, it has never given due pub-
licity of its straight baselines on charts.
The working paper provides with respect to islands that "in
principle" a state's sovereign right to delimit its territorial sea
applies as well to islands as to mainland areas. A special rule
however, is applicable to archipelagoes: "an archipelago or an
island chain consisting of islands close to each other may be
taken as an integral whole in defining the territorial sea around
it.,162
The working paper denies the right of passage through straits
lying within a state's territorial sea regardless of the prior or
existing use of the strait for international navigation. Passage
of foreign military vessels is subject to prior notification or
approval at the discretion of the coastal state. Although no pro-
vision concerning the right of overflight above the territorial sea
is included in the paper, as such a right is not recognized in
customary international law, the omission cannot constitute PRC
recognition.
Part II of the working paper concerns the "exclusive economic
zone or fishery zone." It is provided that "a coastal state may rea-
sonably define an exclusive economic zone beyond and adjacent to
its territorial sea in accordance with its geographical and geologi-
cal conditions, the state of its natural resources and its needs of
national economic development. '163 The limit of the zone is set as
up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline of the territorial sea
within which the coastal state has ownership of all natural re-
261 Cf. supra note 146 and accompanying text.
32 Supra note 157.
1"6 Id. 2.
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sources, "including living and non-living resources of the whole
water column, seabed and its subsoil."''
The inclusion of the factor of the geological condition is appar-
ently closely related to the problem of the continental shelf. The
PRC has defined the continental shelf as "the natural prolonga-
tion of the continental territory."' 1" 5 Unless the delimitation of
the economic zone takes into consideration this geological ele-
ment, China would be forced to share the continental shelf with
Japan in the Yellow and East China Seas in conformity with the
equidistance rule, even though the shelf is the natural prolonga-
tion of China's continental territory and not that of Japan.166
It should be noted that while the PRC working paper sets a
limit upon the economic zone, no such limit was provided for the
continental shelf. The working paper provides that "a coastal
State may reasonably define, according to its specific geographical
conditions, the limits of the continental shelf under its exclusive
jurisdiction beyond its territorial sea or economic zone" (Em-
phasis added).17 Therefore, a state's continental shelf may ex-
tend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline of the
territorial sea if its geographical conditions warrant such an
extension. However, the superjacent waters of the continental
shelf beyond the territorial sea, the economic zone or the fishery
zone "are not subject to the jurisdiction of the coastal State."'16
In other words, such water areas are high seas.
With respect to the right of passage through the economic
zone, the working paper provides that "the normal navigation
and overflight on the water surface of and in the airspace above
the economic zone by ships and aircraft of all States shall not be
prejudiced."" 9 No provision was made for subjecting military
vessels or military aircraft to a requirement of prior notice or
permission. Presumably, their right of passage is the same as
non-military ships or aircraft.
Other provisions in the working paper generally reflected the
PRC position on the economic zone as stated by the PRC dele-
gate at the Seabed Committee.170 The above rules concerning
i" Id.
'Old. 3.
'"The PRC has not yet articulated its claim on the continental shelf of the Yellow Sea
and the East China Sea. However, the ROC deposited its instrument of ratification of the
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf on Oct. 12. 1970 with the reservation to Article
6 "that the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to two or more States whose
coasts are adjacent to and/or opposite each other shall be determined in accordance with
the principle of the natural prolongation of their land territories." 10 INT'L LEGAL MA-
TURALS 452 (1971). The seaward limit of the five "sea-bed reserve areas" promulgated by
the ROC on October 16, 1970, is approximately coincident with the 200-meter contour line.
Chung-yang jib-pso (Central Daily News), Oct. 16, 1970.
ml Supra note 157, at 3.
Is Id.
'Old. 4.
I"oSee. aupra note 148 and accompanying text.
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economic zone will, mutatis mutandis, apply to the exclusive
fishing zone.
A question closely related to the economic zone is the carrying
out of scientific research in this area. The extension of the scope
of the territorial sea or economic zone up to 200 nautical miles
would necessarily include a large part of the ocean formerly
considered a high seas area freely accessible for scientific re-
search. According to the PRC these areas would no longer be
accessible without restriction for scientific research under a 200
mile regime. The PRC supported the view of many developing
countries that no freedom of scientific research in either terri-
torial sea or economic zone exists. In a working paper on marine
scientific research submitted to the Subcommittee III of the
Seabed Committee on July 19, 1973, it is provided:
To conduct marine scientific research in the sea area
within the national jurisdiction of a coastal State, prior
consent of the coastal State concerned must be sought,
and the relevant laws and regulations of the coastal
State must be observed.
A coastal State is entitled to take part in the scientific
research work conducted by other States in the sea area
within its national jurisdiction and to receive data and
results obtained in such work. The publication and
transfer of such data and results are subject to the prior
consent of the coastal State concerned. 17'
The above were the positions of the PRC before the opening of
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
6. The PRC and the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
was held in Caracas, Venezuela, between June 20 and August 29,
1974. The position of the PRC on the territorial sea and eco-
nomic zone was essentially the same as that stated above. The
PRC was strongly opposed to the position of the United States
and the Soviet Union on the breadth of territorial sea, the rights
and duties of the coastal state over the economic zone, and the
question of passage through straits for international navigation.
At the conference, the United States, the principal supporter
of the principle of a "package" settlement, was willing to ac-
cept "a maximum outer limit of 12 nautical miles for the terri-
171 U.N. Doe. A/Ac. 138/Sc. III/L.42 (1978). See also Shen Wei-Hang's speech at Sub-
committee III of the Seabed Ccr.mittee held on April 2, 1973 in Press Release, People's
Republic of China Mission to the United Nations (no date).
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torial sea and of 200 miles for the economic zone ... conditional
on a satisfactory overall treaty package, and, more specifically,
on provisions for unimpeded transit of international straits and
a balance between coastal state rights and duties within the eco-
nomic zone."'' 7 As regards the rights of other states in a coastal
state's economic zone, the United States held the view that no
"unjustifiable interference" with navigation and overflight by
the coastal state is permitted and that insofar as a coastal state
does not fully utilize its fishery resources, it must "permit foreign
fishing."1- With respect to the question of scientific research in
the economic zone, the United States supported a proposal to
obligate the state conducting the research to notify the coastal
state, provide for its participation, and to insure sharing of the
data and assistance in interpreting such data. 17 4 The Soviet posi-
tion on the above questions was essentially the same as that of
the United States.175
The PRC's position on the delimitation of the territorial sea
and the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal state over its eco-
nomic zone flatly contradicted that of the United States and the
Soviet Union. 76 In particular, with respect to coastal state
control over fisheries and scientific research in the economic
zone, PRC delegate Ling Ching said the following at the Con-
ference's Second Committee meeting on August 1, 1974:
We are of the opinion that a coastal state may, in
accordance with its wishes and needs, allow foreign
fishermen to fish in the sea areas under its jurisdiction
by bilateral or regional agreements, since it is a matter
of the exercise of sovereignty by the coastal state and
should be decided by the coastal state itself. But it must
not be provided beforehand that the coastal state have
the 'obligation' to grant foreign states any such
rights ....
,72 Statement by Ambassador Stevenson to the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea at Caracas, July 11, 1974, in DEPT. OF STATE, LAW OF THE SEA: THIED
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE 9. See also, Statement by J. N. Moore before the Sabcom-
mittee on Immigration, Citizenship. and International Law of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, March 14, 1974. Id. 3.
21 See, U.S. Draft Articles on Economic Zone and Continental Shelf, arts. 8, 13, U.N.
Doe. A/CONF. 62/C.2/L.47 (1974); reprinted in DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 172, at 26-30.
1' Statement by Ambassador Stevenson, Committee III, July 19, 1974, in DEPT. OF STATE,
supra note 172, at 18-21.
"7 For the Soviet position, see generally, Kovalyov. Territorial Waters and International
Law. 1974 J. INT'L AFFAIRS No. 36, at 41-46: Igorev, The Law of the Sea Conference, 1974
Now TIMEs No. 36, at 10-11.
1 Concerning the width of the territorial sea, the PRC took the position that the
"coastal states are entitled to reasonably define their territorial sea of an appropriate
breadth" and that its "maximum limit" should be "decided upon by all countries jointly
on an equal footing." Speech by Chai Su-fan, Leader of the PRC delegation, before Plenary
Session, in At the Conference on the Law of the Sea. Chinese Delegation Leader Chai Shu-
fan's Speech, 17 PEKING REVIEW 13 (No. 28, 1974).
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The superpowers do not recognize the exclusive juris-
diction of the coastal state over the entire economic
zone. Both of them proposed that coastal state jurisdic-
tion should be subject to 'international standards,'
should be 'in conformity with the recommendations of
the competent international organization,' and should
even be 'in compliance with any internationally agreed
rules.' Recently, a superpower, after listing a series of
coastal state 'duties' in respect of the economic zone,
went so far as to openly indicate that the coastal state
may not regulate scientific research and prevention of
vessel-based pollution in the economic zone. 1' 77
A natural consequence of increasing the maximum width of
territorial sea to 12 nautical miles is to make many straits used
for international navigation the territorial sea of the coastal
state or states. A study prepared by the United States Depart-
ment of State indicates that more than 100 world straits are
affected by a 12 mile territorial sea.178 While many maritime
powers, including the United States and the Soviet Union, were
willing to agree to increase the maximum limit of the territorial
sea to 12 nautical miles, they insisted on a guarantee of the
freedom of navigation through straits used for international
navigation but lying within the newly extended limits of the
territorial sea. 179
At the plenary meetings of the Conference's Second Commit-
tee held on July 22 and 23, 1974, the Sultanate of Oman sub-
mitted a proposal entitled "Navigation Through the Territorial
Sea, Including Straits Used for International Navigation.' °
According to this proposal a strait, though lying within the limit
of the territorial sea and used for international navigation,
retains its legal status as territorial sea. The right of passage
of foreign merchant ships is generally guaranteed, but with
respect to the passage of military ships, the proposal provided
that in view of the fundamental rights of a sovereign state "the
coastal state may require prior notification to or authorization
by its competent authorities for passage of foreign warships
through its territorial sea, in conformity with regulations in
force in such a state."'Is At the same time, the Soviet Union also
I7 At the U.N. Coferenlce o7 the Law of the Sea. China Supports 200-mile Sea Limit
and Exclusive Economic Zone, 17 PEKING REVIEW 6 (No. 33, Aug. 16, 1974).
HI OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, DEPT. OF STATE, WORLD STRAITS AFFECTED BY A TWELVE
MILE TERRITORIAL SEA
VME.g.. Statement by J. N. Moore, Committee II, July 22, 1974, in DEPT. OF STATE,
supra note 172, at 21-24.
'"See U.N. Doe. A/CoNF.62/C.2/L.16, in THIRD U.N. CONF. ON THE LAW OF THE SEA,
OFF. REC. 192 (1975).
Is' Id. at 194.
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
submitted a proposal entitled "Draft Articles on Straits Used
for International Navigation" to the Second Committee, which
provided, inter alia, for the "enjoyment of the equal freedom of
navigation (as that of the case on the high seas) for the pur-
pose of transit passage through such straits" by all s.hips.'18 -
On July 23, 1974, Deputy Leader of the Chinese Delegation
Ling Ching commented on the above two proposals at the Sec-
ond Committee. He said:
The Chinese Delegation has consistently held that,
on the premise that the sovereignty of the strait state is
fully respected, the needs of international navigation
must be taken into consideration and all necessary and
reasonable measures adopted so as to safeguard inter-
national transport and trade against impediment ...
The passage of foreign military vessels is, however,
entirely different in nature from that of foreign mer-
chant vessels, and should be strictly distinguished from
the latter.
The superpowers, however, have always tried their
best to obliterate this distinction under the smokescreen
of 'all ships' and have fabricated all sorts of pretexts in
an attempt to impose on other states their proposition
of free passage through straits by warships. .... 183
With respect to the so-called package settlement-that is,
some states suggested that their acceptance of some aspects of
the law of the sea such as economic zone is contingent upon the
n- er states' acceptance of free passage through straits by all
ships, including warships-Ling Ching said that the interrela-
tions between various aspects of the law of the sea must never
be accommodated at the expense of the sovereignty of the states
concerned and the interests of international peace and security.
He said:
Any attempt to give 'recognition' to the legitimate de-
mands of the developing countries, such as the economic
zone, etc., in exchange for 'free passage through straits'
by military ships will definitely not be tolerated.'8
When the Conference ended on August 29, it had not adopted
a new convention on the law of the sea. Therefore, the Con-
M U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.11, supra note 180, at 189.
13 U.N. Conference on Law of the Sea, Debate on the Question of Straits for International
Navigation, 17 PEKING REViEw 10 (No. 31, Aug. 2. 1974).
JbiId.
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ference recommended to the General Assembly of the United
Nations that another session of up to eight weeks be held at
Geneva from March 17 to May 3 or 10, 1975, and it agreed that
its final session-for which it did not specify a date-should
be held in Caracas to sign the documents which would emerge.18 5
In view of this development, at the time of this writing in
December 1974, it is impossible to make a thorough coverage of
the PRC's participation at the unfinished Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea.
7. Concluding Observations
Although China became acquainted with the regime of terri-
torial sea in the mid-nineteenth century, it did not articulate its
position on the breadth of the territorial sea until the early
1930s. China's practice prior to that time indicated that it did
in fact respect a three nautical mile territorial sea. As a country
with a negligible naval force and backward fishing industry,
China could not fully protect its national interests and security
by accepting the three mile limit, however. Both before and
after its removal to Taiwan, the ROC government has never
been satisfied with this limit. Due to the fact that China con-
sistently relied upon support from the United States and Great
Britain in the face of constant Japanese aggression, China was
reluctant to challenge the then prevailing practice, supported by
the United States, Great Britain, and many other maritime
powers, of a three nautical mile limit. In addition, the ROC, con-
sistently claiming to be the only legal government of China,
could not disregard the interest of China as a whole, and it is
too obvious that before the mainland becomes a significant
maritime power, an extended territorial sea would better serve
its interests. Since 1950, however, the ROC itself has become a
medium size maritime power and would no longer benefit from
an extended territorial sea.
When the PRC government gained control of mainland China
in late 1949, it apparently faced a similar dilemma. To protect
its national interests and security it was certainly desirable for
the PRC to extend its territorial sea beyond the three nautical
mile limit, but it was necessary to take into serious consideration
the possible reaction of maritime powers, especially the United
States and the United Kingdom, if such a measure were taken.
Consequently, the PRC was very cautious in approaching this
Sec 11 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 110-111 (No. 8, Aug.-Sept. 1974). This session has
subsequently concluded without agreement and another session will be held in New York in
early 1976.
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objective. It was not until September, 1958, that the PRC finally
extended its territorial sea to twelve nautical miles. By that time,
the traditional three-nautical mile rule had already been seriously
challenged at the 1958 First United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, and by the practice of some states. When the
PRC took action to extend its territorial sea, it also mobilized its
legal scholars to defend its position and as a result, the question
of territorial sea became, with the exception of the legal status
of Taiwan, the most widely discussed topic in the PRC's litera-
ture of international law.
In recent years, the PRC has approached the question of the
territorial sea and its related problems not primarily from the
consideration of China's national interests, but rather as a
means of supporting the opposition of Third World countries to
the "hegemony" of the two superpowers, the United States and
the Soviet Union. However, there are many Third World coun-
tries and their views and interests are not necessarily the same
on all major issues of the territorial sea. The PRC's position on
each issue seems to reflect a degree of consensus among the Third
World countries. If the great majority of these countries takes
a similar position toward a particular issue, the PRC also takes
that position regardless of the fact that in the long run it may
have a detrimental effect on its increasingly developed naval
power and maritime merchant fleet. Its position on passage
through a strait used for international navigation lying within
the territorial sea of a coastal state is an example. The PRC
supported the proposal that a coastal state may subject the
passage of military vessels to prior notification or consent. 18 6
With respect to issues which are controversial among the
Third World countries, the PRC is taking a flexible and general
position. Thus, on the question of the breadth of territorial sea,
the PRC takes the position that a coastal state may define a
reasonable limit of territorial sea and the maximum limit should
be decided by all countries concerned. The PRC has not yet
disclosed its position on the exact limit of the "maximum limit,"
13 See note 123 supra, and accompanying text. In August 1967, the United States coast
guard icebreakers informed the Soviet Union that they intended to pass the Vil'kitskii
straits which are entirely within the Soviet 12 mile territorial sea, but between two parts
of the high seas used for international navigation. The Soviet Ministry of the Maritime
Fleet immediately sent a radio message to United States ships which said:
Vil'kitskii straits are within USSR territorial waters. Therefore sailing of any foreign
navy ships in the straits is subject to regulations of safety of USSR frontiers. For
paspsing the straits according to the above regulations military ships must obtain pre-
liminary permission of the USSR Government through diplomatic channels one month
before expected date of passage.
In view of the Soviet objection to free passage, the United States found it necessary to
cancel the proposed passage. See W. E. BuTL, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE LAW OF THE
SEA 66-70 (1971).
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thus avoiding having to take sides with either those Third
World countries favoring a twelve mile limit or those which
oppose such a limit. With respect to the question of the interest
of land-locked countries in an extended territorial sea or eco-
nomic zone of neighboring coastal countries, the PRC took a
similar position by saying that they should "enjoy reasonable
rights and interests in the economic zones of neighboring coastal
states and have the right of transit through the territory and
territorial seas of the latter and other sea areas.
187
sI" See, Chinese Delegation Leader Chai Shu-fan's Speech, supra note 176.
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